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INTRODUCTION 
Domestic violence is a deeply rooted problem that exists in every 
country in the world.1  For the most part, however, the international 
community has yet to create effective legal standards that exclusively 
address domestic violence.  Despite this unfortunate void, the rights 
of battered women may be asserted under international and regional 
human rights conventions that are legally binding upon ratifying 
states.  The International Bill of Human Rights, comprised of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),2 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)3 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”),4 sets forth general human rights standards that victims of 
                                                          
 1. In a 2000 report, Amnesty International indicated that: 
Violence in the home is a truly global phenomenon.  The figures may vary in 
different countries but the suffering and its causes are similar around the 
world . . . . According to World Bank figures, at least 20 per cent of women 
around the world have been physically abused or sexually assaulted.  Official 
reports in the USA say that a woman is battered every 15 seconds and 700,000 
are raped every year.  In India, studies have found that more than 40 per cent 
of married women reported being kicked, slapped or sexually abused for 
reasons such as their husbands’ dissatisfaction with their cooking or cleaning, 
jealousy, and a variety of other motives.  At least 60 women were killed in 
domestic violence in Kenya in 1998-99, and 35 per cent of women in Egypt 
reported being beaten by their husbands.  For millions of women the home is 
not a haven but a place of terror. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS: TORTURE AND ILL-
TREATMENT OF WOMEN 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter AI 2000 REPORT], available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact400012001 (last visited May 18, 2004).  
See generally DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GLOBAL VIEW (Randal W. Summers & Allan M. 
Hoffman eds., 2002); see generally TOO CLOSE TO HOME: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE 
AMERICAS (Andrew R. Morrison & Maria Loreto Biehl eds., 1999). 
 2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 
3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter  UDHR], available at 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b1udhr.htm (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
instree/b3ccpr.htm (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 4. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
2
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domestic violence may invoke against their state of citizenship.  That 
is, battered women who have exhausted all domestic remedies and 
who still find that the state has failed to adequately address their 
grievances, may hold the state liable if that state is a party to the above 
instruments.  The same can be done under the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”)5 together with its Optional Protocol,6 and under the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).7  Likewise, regional 
instruments may offer protection for battered women. The European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”),8 the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“ACHR”),9 together with the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women 
(“Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women”),10 and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African 
Charter”)11 are the major regional human rights documents that may 
be invoked by victims of domestic violence.  The following is a 
summary of applicable provisions from the aforementioned 
documents as well as a brief explanation of how the various human 
rights bodies operate.  The most critical failing of the institutions 
                                                          
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], available at http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 5. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW], available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e1cedaw.htm (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 6. See generally Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter CEDAW 
Optional Protocol], available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ 
cedawopprot-2000.html (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 7. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT], 
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/h2catoc.htm (last visited May 
18, 2004). 
 8. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR], available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf (last visited May 20, 
2004). 
 9. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 
[hereinafter ACHR], available at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/oasinstr/ 
zoas3con.htm (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 10. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication 
of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534, [hereinafter Inter-
American Convention on Violence Against Women],  available at http://www1.umn. 
edu/humanrts/instree/brazil1994.html (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 11. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, 
[hereinafter African Charter], available at http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr. 
html (last visited May 20, 2004). 
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discussed below is the lack of adequate enforcement.  That is, while 
some of the international and regional courts are capable of 
rendering binding decisions, the ultimate responsibility lays with the 
States’ Parties to the various conventions to implement these 
decisions. 
I.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DEFINED 
Domestic violence is one of the numerous forms of violence against 
women that have been identified worldwide.12  The United Nations 
defined the term “violence against women” in a 1993 declaration as 
“any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result 
in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, 
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.”13  The declaration 
further notes that violence against women can occur within the family 
or within the general community and that it may be condoned or 
perpetrated by government officials.14  Having included domestic 
violence as a form of violence against women, the United Nations 
further explained that: 
The term ‘domestic violence’ is used to describe actions and 
omissions that occur in varying relationships.  The term is used 
narrowly to cover incidents of physical attack, when it may take the 
form of physical and sexual violations. . . . The result of such 
physical violence can range from bruising to killing; what may often 
start out as apparently minor attacks can escalate both in intensity 
and frequency. . . . ‘[D]omestic violence’ . . . [also] include[s] 
psychological or mental violence, which can consist of repeated 
verbal abuse, harassment, confinement and deprivation of physical, 
financial and personal resources . . . .15 
                                                          
 12. See Johanna Bond & Robin Phillips, Violence Against Women as a Human 
Rights Violation: International Institutional Responses, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 481, 482 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN] (citing other forms of violence against 
women including “rape, sexual assault, forced prostitution, female genital mutilation, 
female infanticide, and sexual harassment.  Other lesser known forms of violence 
against women include honor killing . . . dowry violence . . . [and] sex trafficking in 
women . . . .”). 
 13. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 
48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., art. 1, Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 Declaration on Violence Against Women], available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.48.104.En?Opend
ocument (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 14. See id. at art. 2 (stating violence in the family may include battery, sexual 
abuse, and marital rape while violence in the general community may include rape, 
sexual harassment at work, and trafficking in women). 
 15. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT VIENNA, CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, STRATEGIES FOR CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A 
4
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Scholars have confirmed that “[g]ender-based violence, such as . . . 
domestic violence, involves some form of physical assault or intrusion.  
As a result, these forms of violence inherently violate the rights of 
bodily integrity and security of the person.”16  However, others point 
out that “extensive and continually expanding research literature 
supports the assertion that domestic violence is associated with a wide 
range of traumatic psychological reactions . . . .”17 It is important to 
note that, for the purposes of this article, I will solely focus on legal 
avenues available to women since the overwhelming majority of 
domestic violence victims are adult females.18  There are situations, 
though, where targeted victims could be young boys and girls as well 
as elderly persons (male and female).19 
II.  THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES PERTAINING 
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A.  The United Nations Campaign for Women’s Rights 
As previously mentioned, the United Nations addressed the issue of 
violence against women as part of its general ban on gender-based 
discrimination.20  Shortly thereafter, the 1993 World Human Rights 
                                                          
RESOURCE MANUAL 6 (1993) [hereinafter U.N. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL]. 
 16. SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 12, at 485. 
 17. Ela Grdinic, Application of the Elements of Torture and Other Forms of Ill-
Treatment, as Defined by the European Court and Commission of Human Rights, to 
the Incidents of Domestic Violence, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 232 
(2000). 
 18. See WOMEN, LAW & DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL, STATE RESPONSES TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CURRENT STATUS AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS 1 (Rebecca P. Sewall 
et al. eds., 1996); see also HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION 
STRATEGIES: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND LEGAL REMEDIES 102 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 
2002) (explaining from a U.S. perspective that “[d]emographic analyses of domestic 
violence offenses reported to the police confirm the observation that domestic 
violence is most frequently perpetrated by males against their female partners and 
that males constitute only a small fraction of the total number of victims in domestic 
violence cases”); see also Callie Marie Rennison, Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-
2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: CRIME DATA BRIEF, Feb. 2003, at 1 (reporting U.S. 
Department of Justice statistics that, in 2001 alone, 85 percent of the victims of 
intimate partner violence were women (588,490 crimes)), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 19. See WOMEN, LAW & DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 18, at 1 
(“Violence within the domestic arena takes many forms.  Young boys may be victims 
of sexual and physical abuse.  Elderly family members and the infirm are equally 
vulnerable and, in some cases, husbands are attacked by their wives.”).  See generally 
PHILIP W. COOK, ABUSED MEN: THE HIDDEN SIDE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1997) 
(examining the neglected social issue of violence against men). 
 20. See EUROPEAN UNION, BREAKING THE SILENCE: EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3 (2000) (aiming to advance victim protection, ensure preventive 
measures, and improve available information and statistics on violence against 
women); see also U.N. CHARTER, art. 55(c).  See generally CEDAW, supra note 5 
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Conference confirmed that women’s rights are human rights,21 and 
states could then be held accountable for condoning and/or failing 
to prevent domestic violence and, thus, failing to protect their female 
citizens in general.22  A Platform for Action was established in 1995 at 
the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China.23  
The Beijing Declaration, which accompanied the 1995 Platform for 
Action, solidified the world community’s resolve to, inter alia, “ensure 
the full enjoyment by women and the girl child of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, . . . take effective action against violations 
of these rights and freedoms”24 and “[p]revent and eliminate all 
forms of violence against women and girls.”25  The Platform for 
Action identified violence against women as one of its critical areas of 
concern,26 delineated the scope of its definition, which includes 
                                                          
(defining discrimination against women and taking measures to end such 
discrimination including abolishing discriminatory laws, establishing tribunals to 
ensure protection against discrimination, and ensuring equal access to political and 
public life). 
 21. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on 
Human Rights, ch. II, Pt. B. sec. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?Ope
nDocument (last visited May 20, 2004) (“The World Conference on Human Rights 
urges the full and equal enjoyment by women of all human rights and that this be a 
priority for Governments and for the United Nations.”); see also id. (“The equal 
status of women and the human rights of women should be integrated into the 
mainstream of United Nations system-wide activity.  These issues should be regularly 
and systematically addressed throughout relevant United Nations bodies and 
mechanisms.”). 
 22. See Barbara Stark, Domestic Violence and International Law: Good-Bye Earl 
(Hans, Pedro, Gen, Chou, etc.), 47 LOY L. REV. 255, 262-65 (2001) [hereinafter Stark 
1]. 
Historically, domestic violence was not viewed as a violation of women’s 
human rights because it was not perpetuated by the state.  Rather, it was 
considered ‘private,’ ‘natural,’ or ‘cultural.’  International consciousness has 
been raised in the last decade, however . . . . Now, a state’s acquiescence, or 
failure to take effective measures to combat domestic violence, is recognized 
as a violation of women’s human rights. 
Id. 
 23. See Beijing Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.177/20, ch. 1 (1995), [hereinafter Platform for Action], available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e5dplw.htm (last visited May 20, 2004) 
(explaining that the Platform for Action “requires immediate and concerted action by 
all to create a peaceful, just, humane and equitable world based on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the principle of equality for all people of all ages 
and from all walks of life” and that it “will require a strong commitment on the part of 
Governments, international organizations and institutions at all levels”). 
 24. Id. at para. 23. 
 25. Id. at para. 29. 
 26. See id. at ch. 3, para. 46 (including additional critical areas of concern, such 
as women in poverty, unequal access to education and healthcare, and discrimination 
against the girl child). 
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domestic violence,27 and made some of the following 
recommendations to governments: 
(b) Refrain from engaging in violence against women and exercise 
due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with 
national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether 
those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons; 
(c) Enact and/or reinforce penal, civil, labour and administrative 
sanctions in domestic legislation to punish and redress the wrongs 
done to women and girls who are subjected to any form of violence, 
whether in the home, the workplace, the community or society; 
(d) Adopt and/or implement and periodically review and analyse 
legislation to ensure its effectiveness in eliminating violence against 
women, emphasizing the prevention of violence and the 
prosecution of offenders; take measures to ensure the protection of 
women subjected to violence, access to just and effective remedies, 
including compensation and indemnification and healing of 
victims, and rehabilitation of perpetrators; 
(e) Work actively to ratify and/or implement international human 
rights norms and instruments as they relate to violence against 
women, including those contained in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights . . . the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights . . . the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights . . . and the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 
(f) Implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women . . . . 
(h) Provide women who are subjected to violence with access to the 
mechanisms of justice and, as provided for by national legislation, 
to just and effective remedies for the harm they have suffered and 
inform women of their rights in seeking redress through such 
mechanisms . . . .28 
The 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action were the first 
steps towards showing a strong commitment, at the international 
level, to combating violence against women (domestic violence 
included). 
In order to ensure that such commitment was maintained, the UN 
General Assembly decided to convene a special session entitled 
“Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the 
Twenty-First Century,” better known as Beijing + 5.29  At this session, 
                                                          
 27. See id. at ch. 4, para. 114(a) (encompassing violence that occurs in the family, 
such as battery, sexual abuse, and marital rape). 
 28. Id. at ch. 4, para. 125. 
 29. See Beijing+5 Process and Beyond, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess. (2000) (reviewing 
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member states adopted a Political Declaration30 and an Outcome 
Document entitled “Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.”31  The Political 
Declaration reaffirmed the goals of the 1995 Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action, including the eradication of violence against 
women (as well as domestic violence)32 and 
pledg[ed] to undertake further action to ensure their full and 
accelerated implementation, inter alia, through the promotion and 
protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and 
programmes and promoting full participation and empowerment 
of women and enhanced international cooperation for the full 
implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action.33 
The Outcome Document indicated that, while some progress had 
been made since the 1995 Beijing conference, “barriers remain[ed] 
and . . . the goals set and commitments made in Beijing need[ed] to 
[be] implemented further.”34  With respect to violence against 
women, the Outcome Document noted the following achievements 
on the part of states: 
There is increased awareness of and commitment to preventing and 
combating violence against women and girls, including domestic 
                                                          
the progress of implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action), 
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/bfbeyond.htm (last 
visited May 20, 2004).  The special General Assembly session was held on June 5-9, 
2000. Id. 
 30. See Political Declaration, G.A. Res. S-32/2, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Special Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-23/2 (2000) [hereinafter Political Declaration] (reaffirming 
commitment to goal and objectives of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action as well as the implementation of the Platform for Action’s critical areas of 
concern), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/ress232e.pdf 
(last visited May 20, 2004). 
 31. See Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform of Action, G.A. Res. S-23/2, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Special Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/S-23/3 (2000) [hereinafter Outcome Document] (detailing achievements 
and obstacles in critical areas of concern, including women and poverty, education of 
women, health, and violence against women), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/ress233e.pdf (last visited May 20, 
2004). 
 32. See Political Declaration, supra note 30, paras. 1-2. 
 33. Id. at para. 8; see also Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the 
Outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women and of the Special Session of 
the General Assembly entitled “Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and 
Peace for the Twenty-first Century”, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/341 
(2000) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary General], available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/ungass.pdf (last visited May 20, 
2004) for a subsequent report issued by the UN Secretary General providing more in-
depth analysis of the Political Declaration, its implementation and follow-up. 
 34. Outcome Document, supra note 31, at 2-3. See generally Report of the 
Secretary General, supra note 33. 
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violence, which violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment of 
their human rights and fundamental freedoms, through, inter alia, 
improved legislation, policies and programmes.  Governments have 
initiated policy reforms and mechanisms, such as interdepartmental 
committees, guidelines and protocols, national, multidisciplinary 
and coordinated programmes to address violence.  Some 
Governments have also introduced or reformed laws to protect 
women and girls from all forms of violence and laws to prosecute 
the perpetrators . . . . Some progress has been made in the 
provision of services for abused women and children, including 
legal services, shelters, special health services and counselling, 
hotlines and police units with special training.  Education for law 
enforcement personnel, members of the judiciary, health-care 
providers and welfare workers is being promoted.  Educational 
materials for women and public awareness campaigns have been 
developed as well as research on the root causes of violence . . . .  
Successful cooperation has been achieved between governmental 
and non-governmental organizations in the field of preventing 
violence against women.35 
Having delineated some of the accomplishments in the campaign 
to eradicate violence against women, the Outcome Document stressed 
that women were still victims of various forms of abuse and domestic 
violence, in particular, that had not been effectively addressed: 
Inadequate understanding of the root causes of all forms of 
violence against women and girls hinders efforts to eliminate 
violence against women and girls.  There is a lack of comprehensive 
programmes dealing with the perpetrators, including programmes, 
where appropriate, which would enable them to solve problems 
without violence.  Inadequate data on violence further impedes 
informed policy-making and analysis.  Socio-cultural attitudes which 
are discriminatory and economic inequalities reinforce women’s 
subordinate place in society.  This makes women and girls 
vulnerable to many forms of violence, such as physical, sexual and 
psychological violence occurring in the family, including 
battering. . . .  Domestic violence, including sexual violence in 
marriage, is still treated as a private matter in some countries.  
Insufficient awareness of the consequences of domestic violence, 
how to prevent it and the rights of victims still exists.  Although 
improving, the legal and legislative measures, especially in the 
criminal justice area, to eliminate different forms of violence 
against women and children, including domestic violence . . . are
                                                          
 35. Outcome Document, supra note 31, at 6. 
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weak in many countries.  Prevention strategies also remain 
fragmented and reactive and there is a lack of programmes on 
these issues.36 
These limitations, described during the Beijing + 5 conference in 
June 2000, are still prevalent today and, while declarations and 
international conferences are pertinent venues for pointing out such 
issues of wide concern and for suggesting solutions,37 they do not 
create binding obligations that require states to enforce these 
solutions.  The 1995 Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action 
as well as the 2000 Political Declaration and Outcome Document 
carry political weight but they are not, on their own, legally binding 
instruments,38 unless they are seen as embodying notions of 
customary human rights law, which has a legally binding effect upon 
states.39 
B.  The International Bill of Human Rights 
There are, however, other international documents, which 
delineate broader human rights categories and which have more 
force than declarations as far as their legally binding nature is 
concerned.  The United Nations has recognized that the 
International Bill of Human Rights, comprised of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),40 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)41 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 7. 
 37. See id. at 17-42 (suggesting various actions to be undertaken at the national 
and international level in order to address women’s issues, including violence against 
women and domestic violence).  Such measures include enacting effective legislation 
to protect women and girls from all forms of violence, prosecuting perpetrators of 
violence against women, and treating all violence against women as criminal offenses.  
Id. 
 38. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 847 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 3rd 
ed. 1999). 
[T]here are a great number of international declarations . . . relevant to 
international human rights that have been adopted by the UN or by other 
international organizations or conferences.  While these instruments are not 
directly binding in a legal sense, they establish broadly recognized standards 
and are frequently invoked in connection with human rights issues. 
Id. 
 39. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 319 (1999) (stating that customary 
human rights law is slightly different from customary international law); see also infra 
Part II.E (discussing the incorporation of domestic violence norms within customary 
international law). 
 40. See generally  UDHR, supra note 2. 
 41. See generally ICCPR, supra note 3. 
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(“ICESCR”),42 provides for fundamental human rights, which, in 
turn, are “general rights for victims of domestic violence.”43  The 
following is a closer analysis of each of the aforementioned 
international human rights documents with a focus on particular 
provisions that could be invoked in connection with domestic 
violence situations.  It should be noted that not all of the analyzed 
provisions would be applicable in all instances since there is always the 
possibility that a State Party has signed/ratified legally binding 
international documents, such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR, with 
reservations to certain provisions.44 
1.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) 
Former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women Radhika Coomaraswamy indicated that the “fundamental 
human rights to be free from torture, gender discrimination and the 
inherent right to life are directly applicable to . . . violence against 
women” (domestic violence included).45  These rights, in addition to 
being well established within customary international law, are 
specifically delineated within the UDHR.  The UDHR sets the tone for 
gender equality and the fundamental right to be free from gender-
based discrimination, which, in turn, is the broad basis for domestic 
violence standards worldwide.  UDHR signatories pledge to recognize 
that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights.”46  Furthermore “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in [the UDHR], without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property or other status.”47  The 
UDHR also acknowledges that “[e]veryone has the right to 
recognition everywhere as a person before the law”48 and that “all are 
                                                          
 42. See generally ICESCR, supra note 4. 
 43. See U.N. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that basic 
human rights encompass the right to a safe domestic environment). 
 44. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 336-37 (permitting states to sign treaties with reservations, except when 
the treaty prohibits reservations or when the reservation contradicts the purpose of 
the treaty).  Theoretically, the law on reservations is the same whether the instrument 
in question is a traditional international treaty or a human rights treaty.  However, 
some have questioned the effectiveness of reservations within the human rights 
context where documents express generally accepted principles.  See HENKIN, supra 
note 39, at 308-10. 
 45. Violence Against Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Economic 
and Social Council, para. 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998). 
 46. UDHR, supra note 2, at art. 1. 
 47. Id. at art. 2. 
 48. Id. at art. 6. 
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equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law . . . .”49  In addition, the UDHR sets the 
premise for the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, which is key for domestic violence victims.50  
The UDHR also designates the inherent “right to life, liberty and the 
security of person” to every individual;51another crucial right for 
women who have been subjected to domestic violence.  Lastly, the 
UDHR ensures that both men and women have the equal right to 
physical and mental health.52  However, as noted above, declarations 
like the UDHR, are not legally binding unless they are seen as part of 
customary international law.53  Some scholars argue further that, the 
UDHR, in particular, has a legally binding effect on all United 
Nations members since it is “an authoritative interpretation of the 
general human rights commitments contained in the [United 
Nations] Charter.”54 
2.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 
Fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, the right to be 
free from torture and the right to be free from gender discrimination 
that can refer directly to violence against women, are also delineated 
in the ICCPR, which entered into force on March 23, 1976.55  Article 
7 of the ICCPR states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”56  The right 
to life, belonging to both men and women, is inscribed in the first 
paragraph of Article 6: “[e]very human being has the inherent right 
to life.  This right shall be protected by law.  No one shall be 
                                                          
 49. Id. at art. 7 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at art. 5. 
 51. Id. at art. 3. 
 52. See id. at art. 25, para. 1. 
 53. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 262 (noting scholars’ recognition 
of the UDHR as “binding, customary international law”); see also id. at 848 (“One oft-
stated argument is that at least some standards set by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, although initially only recommendatory and nonbinding, have now 
become legally binding as customary law through their wide acceptance by nations as 
having normative effect.”). 
 54. Id. at 848. 
 55. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 49, para. 1 (“The present Covenant shall 
enter into force three months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of 
accession.”); see also Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human 
Rights Treaties (listing the States which have signed and/or ratified various U.N. 
treaties including the ICCPR), at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited 
May 20, 2004). 
 56. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 7. 
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arbitrarily deprived of his life.”57  Gender equality and the right to be 
free from gender-based discrimination appear within several 
provisions of the ICCPR depending upon the scope of its application: 
Article 2(1): Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status . . . . 
Article 14(1): All persons shall be equal before the courts and 
tribunals.  In the determination of any criminal charge against him, 
or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a compact, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law . . . . 
Article 16: Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere 
as a person before the law. 
Article 23(4): States Parties to the present Covenant shall take 
appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of 
spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution . . . . 
Article 26: All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.  In 
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination 
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.58 
Furthermore, the ICCPR guarantees, to all persons, the right to 
effective legal protections and remedies.59 Some scholars have 
concluded that certain States Parties have violated this right by 
impeding upon the ability of domestic violence victims to access the 
court system.60  High standards of proof, strict evidentiary 
requirements and unresponsiveness on the part of police are all 
obstacles that battered women continuously encounter.61  If a State 
                                                          
 57. Id. at art. 6, para. 1. 
 58. See id. at art. 2, para. 1; art. 14, para. 1; art. 16; art. 23, para. 4; art. 26. 
 59. See id. at art. 26 (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.”). 
 60. See SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 12, at 487. 
 61. See id.  Scholars have found that: 
In many countries around the world, women victims of domestic violence 
may not be able to document their injuries adequately due to onerous rules 
of evidence in court . . . . For example, in Macedonia, women seeking to 
prosecute their batterers must obtain medical documentation of their 
injuries, which can cost as much as a month’s salary. . . .  These rules deny 
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Party allows for such obstacles, it violates its ICCPR obligations.62 
The ICCPR is a legally binding document upon the states that have 
signed it and/or ratified it by passing domestic legislation.63  Article 2, 
paragraph 1 imposes affirmative obligations upon states not only to 
respect the rights delineated within the ICCPR, but also to ensure that 
those rights are protected through national law.64  Article 2, 
paragraphs 2 and 3 confirm that these affirmative obligations require 
States Parties to frame their legal system in such a manner as to 
ensure the protection of human rights and to provide for an effective 
remedy in cases where those rights have been impeded upon.65  If a 
State Party fails to fulfill its affirmative obligations, individual citizens 
are entitled, under the 1966 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,66 to file 
                                                          
women an effective remedy by preventing the prosecution of crimes of 
violence against women.  In some countries, rules of evidence discount the 
testimony of women.  In Pakistan, for example, Article 17 of the Qanun-e-
Shahadat Order of 1984 (Law of Evidence Order) diminishes the weight of 
women’s testimony in some circumstances to that of half of a man’s 
testimony. . . .  The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order also allows for the admission of 
evidence to show that the victim was ‘immoral.’ . . . . In many countries, 
police refuse to respond to calls relating to domestic violence or to 
investigate assault claims when they discover the victim and the perpetrator of 
the assault are related.  Even if the police investigate and file a report, 
prosecutors often do not pursue the cases.  In some instances, when a woman 
successfully maneuvers through the criminal justice system to have her case 
heard before a judge, the judge dismisses the case or imposes only a nominal 
fine.  For example, in Albania, a woman who attempts to prosecute a 
domestic assault meets with extreme resistance at each step of the criminal 
justice system.  The police, prosecutors, and judges view their role as 
facilitating reconciliation, and they pressure women to ‘pardon’ their 
husbands. . . . 
Id. 
 62. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 26. 
 63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. h (2002).  
Depending upon the manner in which international treaties become binding in each 
country.  In the case of the United States, for example, it is up to the state “to decide 
how it will carry out its international obligations.  Accordingly, the intention of the 
United States determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United 
States or should await implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or 
administrative action.”  Id. 
 64. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 2, para. 1; see also HENKIN,  supra note 39, at 
489 (construing the Covenant’s language to mandate affirmative action by States 
Parties to protect the relevant rights). 
 65. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 2, paras. 2 & 3. 
 66. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. I, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b4ccprp1.htm (last visited May 18, 2004). 
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol 
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by the State Party of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant.  No communication shall be received by the Committee if it 
concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present 
Protocol. 
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complaints with the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), the 
monitoring body of the ICCPR,67 who, in turn, will issue an advisory 
opinion, or a “view,” to the violating State Party.  The State Party, 
then, has the “option” to follow the recommendations of the HRC by 
employing its domestic enforcement mechanisms in order to protect 
the rights asserted by the complainants.68  The State Party’s progress 
is monitored by a Special Rapporteur, whose main function is to 
follow-up with the implementation of the HRC’s views.69  Thus, a 
domestic violence victim, who has exhausted all of her domestic 
remedies, can file a complaint with the HRC asserting her right to be 
free from torture, her right to be free from gender discrimination, 
her inherent right to life and her right to an effective legal remedy 
(depending upon her situation) and the HRC will, in turn, issue an 
opinion, or view, recommending that her state of citizenship employ 
effective means of protecting and ensuring the asserted rights.70  
Then, it is the responsibility of her state of citizenship to implement 
the HRC’s recommendations under the watchful eye of the Special 
Rapporteur. 
3.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”) 
The ICESCR can also provide protection for victims of domestic 
                                                          
Id. 
 67. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 28 (establishing the Human Rights 
Committee (“HRC”)). 
 68. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 491-92.  The Human Rights Committee 
may be described as the guardian of the [ICCPR], with responsibility for 
monitoring its implementation.  Its two main functions . . . are to consider 
reports from, and complaints against, the State Parties.  The former is 
obligatory for all State Parties, while the latter is optional and exists in two 
forms: interstate ‘communications’ under the Covenant, as well as individual 
‘communications’ under the Optional Protocol. The basic obligation of 
States Parties is to implement the rights provided for in Parts I and III of the 
[ICCPR]. 
Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee: Volume I, U.N. 
Human Rights Committee, 70th-72nd Sess., at 131, U.N. Doc. A/56/40 (2001) 
(articulating the responsibilities of the Special Rapporteur, while conceding that 
financial difficulties prevented the initiation of follow up visits), available at 
http:www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/a91dea9af2c00fa7c1256ace0055cab5?Op
endocument (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 70. Unfortunately, thus far, there are no HRC advisory opinions interpreting the 
relevant ICCPR articles in connection with specific domestic violence situations.  See 
United Nations Documents By Treaty (revealing the dearth of the HRC advisory 
opinions interpreting the relevant ICCPR articles in connection with specific 
domestic violence situations), at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf  (last visited May 
18, 2004). 
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violence.71  However, it should be noted that the ICESCR is more 
often used to uphold women’s economic, social and cultural rights.72  
While not as widely invoked in situations involving violence against 
women, one could still argue that certain ICESCR provisions are 
applicable to specific instances of violence within the home, 
depending upon the circumstances.  For example, Article 12, 
paragraph 1 indicates that “States Parties to the [ICESCR] recognize 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.”73  If we follow our initial 
definition of domestic violence from above74 coupled with the 
ICESCR’s guarantee against gender-based discrimination,75 Article 12 
could be read to impose an obligation upon States Parties to protect 
women’s physical and mental health and provide for domestic 
remedies when their health is in peril (i.e. when their partners are 
batterers).  Since the ICESCR seeks to provide rights for both sexes 
equally, battered women are entitled to protection under Article 12. 
The ICESCR can also be read in conjunction with the ICCPR in 
order to ensure that victims of domestic violence have proper access 
to legal redress.  Amnesty International points out that: 
Women may not be able to obtain redress for abuses . . . because 
[they] are deprived of their economic, social and cultural rights.  
Economic dependence and inadequate welfare provision in many 
parts of the world force women to bear continued abuse.  Abused 
women often have nowhere to go, no money to sustain themselves 
                                                          
 71. The ICESCR entered into force on January 3, 1976. See ICESCR, supra note 
4, at art. 27, para. 1 (“The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after 
the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-
fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.”); see also United Nations 
Documents By Treaty, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited 
May 18, 2004). 
 72. See generally Barbara Stark, The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights as a Resource for Women, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 209-243 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter Stark 2] (reviewing the creation of the ICESCR, its valuation of 
“nurturing work” often performed by women, its protection of families, its provision 
of educational rights, and its incorporation of women into the international legal 
arena). 
 73. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 12, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 74. See supra Part I. (defining domestic violence as acts or threats of gender-
based violence that causes or will likely cause physical, sexual or psychological trauma 
within the home). 
 75. See ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 2 (“The States Parties to the present 
Covenant undertake to guarantee that the right enunciated in the present Covenant 
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.”); see also id. at art. 3 (“the States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social 
and cultural changes set forth in the present Covenant.”). 
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or their children, and no funds to seek legal counsel in order to 
pursue redress.  Legal aid is often not available to abused women.  
Social and economic deprivation go hand in hand with ignorance 
of legal rights and the criminal justice process, so women are often 
unaware of their alternatives.76 
The guarantee to provide both men and women with equal 
“enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth” in the 
ICESCR,77 including the right to work78 and the right to earn “a 
decent living for themselves and their families,”79 together with the 
ICCPR’s obligation to provide effective legal protections and remedies 
to all,80 address the economic and social dilemmas that battered 
women face as well as their inability to access the legal system.  Thus, 
an argument can be made that a victim of domestic violence should 
be able to hold a State Party, to both the ICESCR and the ICCPR, 
responsible for not sustaining her economic and social viability, thus, 
in turn, preventing her from reaching the legal system in order to 
obtain redress and protection from her violent partner. 
The ICESCR is monitored by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) and has a legally binding effect upon 
states that have signed and/or ratified it.81  However the affirmative 
obligations of States Parties to the ICESCR are phrased differently 
than those of States Parties to the ICCPR.  Under the ICESCR: 
[e]ach State Party . . . undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.82 
Many scholars are skeptical about the language allowing states to 
“take steps . . . to the maximum of [their] available sources . . . with a 
view to achieve progressively . . . .” because such language is vague and 
undermines the states’ affirmative obligation under the ICESCR.83  
                                                          
 76. AI 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 37. 
 77. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 3.  See also id. at art. 2, para. 2 (setting forth the 
principle of non-discrimination). 
 78. See id. at art. 6, para. 1 (acknowledging the rights to independently select an 
occupation). 
 79. Id. at art. 7(a)(ii). 
 80. See ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 26. 
 81. Depending upon the manner in which international treaties become binding 
within each country.  See, e.g., supra note 63. 
 82. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 1. 
 83. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 518 (questioning the extent of States Parties’ 
responsibilities regarding the ICESCR). 
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The CESCR issued a general comment in 1990 in order to specifically 
address the nature of States Parties’ obligations under Article 2, 
paragraph 1 of the Covenant;84 however, enforceability remains a 
problem with the ICESCR.85  Thus, a domestic violence victim would 
benefit more from invoking the ICCPR and other international 
treaties focused specifically on women’s rights, such as CEDAW, than 
raising an argument solely under the ICESCR. 
C.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“CEDAW”), Its Optional Protocol and the 1993 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
The 1967 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women acknowledged the lack of international protection of 
women’s rights in particular86 and was a precursor to CEDAW, which 
entered into force on September 3, 1981.87  CEDAW does not 
explicitly prohibit violence against women, which encompasses 
domestic violence.  However, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW Committee”) has 
incorporated gender-based violence within CEDAW’s general ban on 
gender-based discrimination.88  In its General Recommendation No. 
                                                          
 84. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Reporting by States 
Parties: CESCR General Comment 3 (1989) (explaining that States Parties must take 
“deliberate, concrete, and targeted” action to achieve covenant goals, including 
legislative, judicial, administrative, economic, educational, and cultural action), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 85. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 518-19 (observing that the vague language used 
to describe States Parties’ responsibilities to the ICESCR may permit States Parties to 
evade their obligations). 
 86. See Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. 
Res. 2263(XXII), U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., (1967), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/21.htm (last visited May 20, 2004). 
Concerned that, despite the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights 
and other instruments of the United Nations and the specialized agencies 
and despite the progress made in the matter of equality of rights, there 
continues to exist considerable discrimination against women . . . . 
Id. 
 87. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 27, para. 1 (“[t]he present Convention shall 
enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or 
accession.”); see also  Division for the Advancement of Women, States Parties to 
CEDAW, at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited 
May 20, 2004); see also Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human 
Rights Treaties (Dec. 9, 2000) at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited 
May 20, 2004). 
 88. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 2 (describing CEDAW signatories’ resolve to 
“condemn discrimination against women in all its forms”); see also Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Violence Against Women: CEDAW General 
Recommendation No. 19, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992) [hereinafter CEDAW 
18
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19, the CEDAW Committee explains the following: 
The Convention in article 1 defines discrimination against women.  
The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, 
that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a 
woman or that affects women disproportionately.  It includes acts 
that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of 
such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.  Gender-based 
violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, 
regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention 
violence.89 
Thus, when analyzing CEDAW in order to find protections for a 
victim of domestic violence, which is a form of violence against 
women, one can use and interpret various articles even though such 
articles do not explicitly address violence. 
Article 2(e) of CEDAW requires its signatories and/or ratifiers90 
“[t]o take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women by any person, organization or enterprise,”91 which 
the CEDAW Committee interpreted as the basis for holding states 
responsible for failing to prevent, investigate and punish acts of 
violence perpetrated by private citizens against women.92  
                                                          
Gen. Rec. 19] (“Gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously 
inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with 
men.”), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ 
300395546e0dec52c12563ee0063dc9d?OpenDocument (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 89. See CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 6; see also CEDAW, supra 
note 5, at art. 1. 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against 
women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis 
of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field. 
Id. 
 90.   Depending upon the manner in which international treaties become 
binding within each country.  See, e.g., supra note 63. 
 91. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 2(e) (emphasis added). 
 92.  See Stark 1, supra note 22, at 269-70 (explaining that states may be held 
responsible for private acts if they fail to take reasonable steps to prevent the 
discriminatory acts or fail to investigate and punish acts of violence).  According to 
the CEDAW Committee, 
discrimination under the Convention is not restricted to action by or on 
behalf of Governments . . . .  For example, under article 2(e) the Convention 
calls on State parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise.  
Under general international law and specific human rights covenants, States 
may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to 
prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and 
for providing compensation. 
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Furthermore, CEDAW’s Article 3 specifies that: 
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, 
social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to ensure the full development and 
advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on a basis of equality with men.93 
Lastly, Article 12, paragraph 1 of CEDAW ensures that both men 
and women have an equal right to physical and mental health and 
indicates that women should have equal access to health care 
services.94  Thus, one could argue that a woman who is a victim of 
domestic violence, whose health is in danger and who cannot receive 
adequate medical attention, can seek protection under CEDAW by 
holding her state of citizenship responsible for not implementing 
legislation or other measures that would have prevented her partner 
from physically abusing her, for failing to investigate and punish her 
partner who has committed domestic violence and for not providing 
the appropriate avenues to access health care. 
Other CEDAW provisions pave the way for further arguments that 
can be made on behalf of domestic violence victims.  The CEDAW 
Committee points out that traditional views regarding women as 
being subordinate to men fuel violence against women (domestic 
violence included).  “Such prejudices and practices may justify 
gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women.  
The effect of such violence on the physical and mental integrity of 
women is to deprive them of the equal enjoyment, exercise and 
knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”95  Article 
2(f) of CEDAW requires States Parties  “[t]o take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women.”96  Article 5(a) compels states: 
[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view of achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of 
the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped 
roles for men and women.”97 
                                                          
CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 9. 
 93. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 3. 
 94. See id. at art. 12, para. 1 (explaining that women should have access to 
medical services including those related to family planning). 
 95. See CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 11. 
 96. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 2(f). 
 97. See id. at art. 5(a). 
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Article 10(c) indicates that States Parties are to ensure that such 
gender stereotypes are eliminated from the education system.98  
Article 14 of CEDAW focuses on empowering women in rural areas 
and ensuring their equal access to various social services including 
adequate health care.99  The CEDAW Committee explains that 
“[r]ural women are at risk of gender-based violence because 
traditional attitudes regarding the subordinate role of women . . . 
persist in many rural communities . . . .”100  Lastly, Article 5(a), 
described above, can be read in conjunction with Article 16, which 
aims at eliminating discrimination against women in all family and 
marriage related matters,101 as a prohibition of domestic violence.  
The CEDAW Committee indicates that: 
Family violence is one of the most insidious forms of violence 
against women.  It is prevalent in all societies.  Within family 
relationships women of all ages are subjected to violence of all 
kinds, including battering, rape, other forms of sexual assault, 
mental and other forms of violence, which are perpetuated by 
traditional attitudes.  Lack of economic independence forces many 
women to stay in violent relationships.  The abrogation of their 
family responsibilities by men can be a form of violence, and 
coercion.  These forms of violence put women’s health at risk and 
impair their ability to participate in family life and public life on a 
basis of equality.102 
Thus, a victim of domestic violence can hold her state of citizenship 
responsible for failing to uphold its obligations under the 
aforementioned CEDAW articles if she can prove that the state has 
not implemented adequate means to eradicate traditional views and 
customs regarding the subordination of women to men from its 
legislation, social structure or education system.  She can argue that 
the state has allowed such prejudices to thrive, thus, fueling violence 
against women in general as well as violence within the home.  When 
analyzing the applicability of certain CEDAW provisions to individual 
domestic violence situations, though, one must take into
                                                          
 98. See id. at art. 10(c) (recommending co-education and the modification of 
textbook and school programs). 
 99. See id. at art. 14. 
 100. See CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 21. 
 101. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 5(a) (stating that states should try to 
“modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women” in order to 
eliminate common prejudices and the stereotyped roles of men and women); see id. 
at art. 16 (stating that States should take steps to ensure that women have equal rights 
to men within the institution of marriage). 
 102. See CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 88, at para. 23. 
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consideration any reservations that a particular State Party might have 
entered when it signed/ratified this treaty.103 
Following CEDAW’s entry into force,104 the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993.105  In this 
declaration, the term “violence against women” was defined more 
precisely since CEDAW itself focuses on the broader notion of 
“discrimination against women.”  The declaration clarifies that “the 
term ‘violence against women’ means any act of gender-based 
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in 
public or in private life.”106  Furthermore Article 2 of the declaration 
indicates that the following types of abuse constitute violence against 
women: 
Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, 
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the 
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital 
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-
spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; 
Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the 
general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual 
harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions 
and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; 
Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or 
condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.107 
Article 3 of the declaration reiterates the rights of battered women, 
which have been articulated in various other international human 
rights instruments: 
                                                          
 103. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (stating that parties may make a reservation to the treaty, as long as that 
reservation is not prohibited by the treaty or violates the purpose of the treaty), 
available at http:www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/viennaconvention.html (last 
visited May 20, 2004); see also CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 28, paras. 1-2 (“(1) The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States the 
text of reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession.  (2) A 
reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall 
not be permitted.”). 
 104. See CEDAW, supra note 5, at art. 23, para. 1 (stating that CEDAW would 
enter into force “on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit with the Secretary 
General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or 
accession”).  CEDAW entered into force on September 3, 1981. 
 105. See generally 1993 Declaration on Violence Against Women, supra note 13. 
 106. Id. at art. 1. 
 107. Id. at art. 2 (emphasis added). 
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Women are entitled to the equal enjoyment and protection of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.  These rights 
include, inter alia: 
The right to life; 
The right to equality; 
The right to liberty and security of person; 
The right to equal protection under the law; 
The right to be free from all forms of discrimination; 
The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental 
health; 
The right to just and favourable conditions of work; 
The right not to be subjected to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.108 
Lastly, Article 4(c) imposes a duty upon states to “[e]xercise due 
diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national 
legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts 
are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.”109  This “due 
diligence” standard is a critical element for dealing with situations of 
domestic violence because it clarifies the misconception that a state 
can dodge its responsibilities simply because the perpetrator of the 
violence was a private actor, thus, outside the scope of the state’s 
authority, or that such violence is justified by existing social or cultural 
traditions.110  While the declaration encourages signatory states to 
abide by the obligations delineated in CEDAW, to condemn violence 
against women and to refrain from “invok[ing] any custom, tradition 
or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its 
elimination,”111 it is not a legally binding document on its own.  
Perhaps if taken in conjunction with CEDAW or if seen as part of
                                                          
 108. Id. at art. 3. 
 109. Id. at art. 4(c) (emphasis added). 
 110. Amnesty International, Respect, Protect, Fulfill- Women’s Human Rights: 
State Responsibility for Abuses by ‘Non-State Actors,’ 5 (2000) (“[t]he concept of due 
diligence is a way to describe the threshold of action and effort which a state must 
demonstrate to fulfill its responsibility to protect individuals from abuses of their 
rights”), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGIOR500012000 (last visited 
May 18, 2004).  “A state cannot, for example, avoid responsibility for the 
mistreatment of domestic workers by arguing that the abuse took place in the privacy 
of the employer’s home, or that it is justified by social or cultural practices.” Id. 
 111. 1993 Declaration on Violence Against Women, supra note 13, at art. 4. 
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customary law,112 one could argue that the aspirations and definitions 
delineated in the declaration have a binding effect upon states. 
Until recently, enforcement of CEDAW was weak.113  On December 
22, 2000, an Optional Protocol entered into force,114 which 
strengthened CEDAW’s means of enforcement and which can be used 
as an important tool to ensure that states protect individual victims by 
undertaking measures to prevent domestic violence.  The protocol 
provides for two new mechanisms to hold States Parties accountable 
for their CEDAW obligations: 
1) the communications procedure, which provides individuals and 
groups the right to lodge complaints with the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women . . . regarding 
violations of the terms of the Convention by State Parties and 2) the 
inquiry procedure, which enables CEDAW to conduct inquiries into 
serious and systematic abuses of women’s human rights within State 
Parties.115 
Consequently, a domestic violence victim, after exhausting her 
domestic remedies, can file a communication with the CEDAW 
Committee, thus, lodging a grievance against her state of citizenship 
for failing to protect her right against gender-based abuse, as well as 
any other applicable right expressed in CEDAW, and for failing to 
undertake measures to prevent domestic violence.116  In turn, the 
                                                          
 112.  See INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 848 (explaining that there are 
many non-binding international human rights declarations that “establish broadly 
recognized standards and are frequently invoked in connection with human rights 
issues”).  See generally infra Part II.E (discussing the incorporation of domestic 
violence standards into customary international law). 
 113. See Laboni Amena Hoq, Note, The Women’s Convention and Its Optional 
Protocol: Empowering Women to Claim Their Internationally Protected Rights, 32 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 677, 684 (2001) (observing that before the adoption of the 
Optional Protocol, the Convention included only two enforcement mechanisms: the 
interstate procedure and the reporting procedure); see also Dame Silvia Cartwright, 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, in 2 WOMEN 
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 165, 179 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig 
eds., 2000) (explaining that CEDAW lacked a mechanism for individual complaint 
procedures prior to the adoption of the Optional Protocol). 
 114. See CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 16, para. 1 (“The present 
Protocol shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the tenth instrument of ratification or 
accession.”); see also UNITED NATIONS, SIGNATURES TO AND RATIFICATIONS OF THE 
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL (Apr. 16, 2003), at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ 
cedaw/sigop.htm (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 115. Hoq, supra note 113, at 678. 
 116. See CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 2 (“Communications may 
be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the 
jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the rights 
set forth in the Convention by that State Party.”); see also id. at pmbl. (“Reaffirming 
[the] determination [of States Parties] to ensure the full and equal enjoyment by 
women of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and to take effective action to 
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CEDAW Committee issues recommendations, or “views,” sharing 
them with all parties involved, including the state in question.117  
Furthermore, the CEDAW Committee can now investigate situations 
in which a particular state has consistently violated CEDAW protected 
rights and has frequently failed to curtail domestic violence within its 
territory.118 
D.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) 
The CAT, which entered into force on June 26, 1987, establishes a 
complete ban on any form of torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment.119  The CAT defines torture as: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.120 
The former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 
Radhika Coomaraswamy,121 various scholars,122 non-governmental 
organizations, such as members of the World Organisation Against 
Torture (“WOAT”)123  and Amnesty International,124 have all 
                                                          
prevent violations of these rights and freedoms.”). 
 117. Id. at art. 7, para. 3. 
 118. See id. at art. 8 (stating that the Committee may conduct an inquiry into a 
state’s actions, which may include a visit to that state).  The Committee will then 
submit its findings to the state, which has six months to respond.  Id. 
 119. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 27, para. 1 (“This Convention shall enter into 
force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.”); see also 
Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 120. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 1, para. 1. 
 121. See Stark 1, supra note 22, at 270. 
 122. See id.; see also Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: 
Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 296 (1994) 
(“[W]hen stripped of privatization, sexism and sentimentality, private gender-based 
violence is no less grave than other forms of inhumane and subordinating official 
violence that have been prohibited by treaty and customary law and recognized by the 
international community as jus cogens, or preemptory norms.”); see also Grdinic, 
supra note 17, at 259 (asserting that domestic violence could represent torture under 
the European Convention on Human Rights). 
 123. See generally The World Organisation Against Torture (providing 
information about the “largest international coalition of NGOs fighting against 
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concluded that, in certain circumstances, domestic violence could 
qualify as torture.  The WOAT associates private forms of torture, like 
domestic violence, with public forms of torture.  “[J]ust as torture by a 
state official typically takes place when the victim is in 
incommunicado detention, at the unsupervised mercy of his 
interrogators or captors and without access to the outside world, 
battered women, because of their domestic situation, live isolated 
from family and friends and others.”125 
Amnesty International indicates that “[t]he severity of harm 
inflicted upon women by private individuals can be just as damaging 
as that inflicted on women who are tortured by agents of the state,” 
and that, in both cases, abuses are intentionally inflicted.126  
Furthermore, “[t]orture in custody is often used not only to extract 
confessions but also to instill profound dread into victims, to break 
their will, to punish them and to demonstrate the power of the 
perpetrators.  Similar purposes characterize acts of torture in the 
family or the community.”127  Amnesty International interprets CAT 
to impose responsibility upon states to not comply, consent or 
acquiesce in128 such private forms of torture as well as “to exercise due 
diligence and to provide equal protection in preventing and 
punishing such abuses by private individuals.”129 
                                                          
torture, summary executions, forced disappearances and all other forms of cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment”), at http://www.omct.org (last visited May 18, 
2004). 
 124. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (“When states 
fail to take the basic steps needed to protect women from domestic violence or allow 
these crimes to be committed with impunity, states are failing in their obligation to 
protect women from torture.”), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/ 
stopviolence/factsheets/violence.html (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 125. CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL & ANNE-LAURENCE LACROIX, VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN: A REPORT 43 (1999).  While WOAT parallels violence within the home with 
torture at the hand of public officials, others disagree: 
Conceived by its promoters and drafters primarily as a response to the use of 
state violence against citizens . . . the [Torture] Convention accordingly 
focus[es] on the actions of public officials and the state’s responsibility for 
them. . . . There is no doubt that the Convention, in its adherence to fairly 
traditional international law paradigms of state responsibility, does exclude 
from its coverage many types of violations of the rights to physical and mental 
integrity of women, and that violence in the family is largely (if not 
completely) untouched by its provisions. 
Andrew Byrnes, The Convention Against Torture, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 183 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. 2000). 
 126. AI 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 1, para. 1. 
 129. AI 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
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Professor Rhonda Copelon found striking similarities between the 
elements of torture listed in Article 1 of CAT and aspects of domestic 
violence: physical and psychological pain are present in both 
instances,130 the general intent required in torture cases is also often 
present in episodes of domestic violence when abusers plan their 
attacks upon women,131 and pain is inflicted with a specific purpose 
in mind in both situations.132  Professor Copelon explains that while 
in cases of torture state involvement must be established, such a 
requirement is not the sine qua non of the definition of torture as a 
human rights violation.133  That is, violence inflicted by anyone, a 
public official or a private citizen, could amount to torture.134  
Consequently, under CAT, States’ Parties are not only obligated to 
protect citizens who are subjected to torture at the hand of public 
officials, but could also be obligated to protect victims of domestic 
violence who are subjected to certain grave abuses by their 
partners.135  According to CAT, states are responsible to investigate, 
prosecute and extradite individuals suspected of torture.136  The same 
obligations can be imposed in cases where domestic violence amounts 
to torture.  CAT dictates that states should avert the possibility of 
situations where torture might arise by ensuring that law enforcement 
personnel are properly trained and reviewed.137  The same training 
and review can prove to be helpful in instances of domestic violence.  
Furthermore, States’ Parties to CAT are required to investigate 
complaints as well as provide legal remedies and compensation when 
                                                          
 130. See Copelon, supra note 122, at 311-19 (describing various methods of abuse, 
including beating, burning, raping, starving, depriving of sleep, and threatening the 
victim or the victim’s family or friends). 
 131. See id. at 327 (observing that male batterers plan their abuse). 
 132. See id. at 329-41 (detailing purposes such as eliciting information, 
punishment, intimidation, discrimination, destruction of personality, and reduction 
of capacities). 
 133. See id. at 341-52. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See AI 2000 REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (“States have a duty under 
international law to take positive measures to prohibit and prevent torture and to 
respond to instances of torture, regardless of whether the torture takes place and 
whether the perpetrator is an agent of the state or a private individual.”); see also 
Amnesty International, End Domestic Violence. End Torture. A Fact Sheet on 
Domestic Violence as Torture, at 1 (“Acts of violence against women [including 
domestic violence] constitute torture when they are of the nature and severity 
envisaged by the concept of torture and the state has failed to provide effective 
protection.”) [on file with the author]. 
 136. CAT, supra note 7, at arts. 4-9. 
 137. See id. at arts. 10-11 (requiring training and periodic review of police, 
doctors, public officials, and others who exercise control over, question, or treat 
detainees and arrested individuals). 
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allegations of torture have been proven.138  The same requirements 
can apply in situations where domestic violence is deemed to be 
torture under CAT. 
States that fail to address domestic violence can be held responsible 
under CAT for having “consented” to or “acquiesced” in such 
behavior. 139  Professor Copelon explains: 
The concepts of consent or acquiescence [in CAT] are broad 
enough to embrace the failure of government to redress domestic 
violence, even if the drafters did not have domestic violence in 
mind.  If the purpose of the “consent or acquiescence” language 
was to cover situations where the state machinery does not work, 
then gender-based violence is a case in point.  Indeed, laws and 
customs that exempt domestic aggressors from sanction, such as 
marital rape exceptions or the defense of honor, reflect active 
encouragement and consent of the state as well as formal gender 
discrimination.  The same is true of state law enforcement practices 
which implicitly condone or minimize the seriousness of gender-
based violence.  Where domestic violence is a matter of common 
knowledge and law enforcement and affirmative prevention 
measures are inadequate, or where complaints are made and not 
properly responded to, the state should be held to have 
“acquiesced” in the continued infliction of violence.140 
Lastly, Professor Copelon argues that CAT could even apply directly 
against private individuals who have perpetrated acts of domestic 
violence, thus bypassing the state as the primarily responsible party: 
“[W]hile the CAT is limited to examining complaints against states 
parties, the provisions for universal criminal jurisdiction and for 
compensation should apply against any private person who commits 
torture or domestic violence ‘at the instigation of’ or ‘with the 
consent or acquiescence of’ an official.”141 
When analyzing the applicability of particular CAT provisions to 
individual domestic violence situations, as Professor Copelon and 
others have done, one must note any reservations that a particular 
State Party might have entered when it signed/ratified this treaty.142 
                                                          
 138. See id. at arts. 12-14 (mandating a “prompt and impartial investigation” of 
complaints and “fair and adequate compensation” for victims). 
 139. See id. at art. 1, para. 1. 
 140. Copelon, supra note 122, at 355-56. 
 141. Id. at 356. 
 142. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 44, at art. 19 
(delineating requirements for making reservations); see also CAT, supra note 7, at 
arts. 28, 30 (permitting reservations and withdrawal of reservations related to 
recognizing the ability of the Committee against Torture to conduct inquiries and 
dispute settlement procedures among signatories). 
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Generally, the Committee Against Torture143 enforces CAT by 
initiating investigations when it receives reliable information that 
torture is being practiced within the territory of a State Party,144 by 
reviewing communications submitted by a State Party alleging that 
another State Party is not fulfilling its CAT obligations,145 and by 
considering communications from individuals who claim that their 
rights have been violated by a State Party to CAT.146  Thus, as 
Professor Copelon and others have argued above, a victim of domestic 
violence can file a communication with the Committee Against 
Torture against her state of citizenship, alleging that the state has 
failed to prosecute, investigate, implement preventive measures, 
provide legal remedies, and/or grant compensation, or has consented 
to or acquiesced in the violent behavior of her spouse by simply 
turning a blind eye to her situation.147 
More specifically, CAT can also be enforced within the context of 
asylum, namely persons fleeing from persecution (including the 
threat of torture) from their country of origin.  If the country to 
which they flee has signed and/or ratified CAT148 and denies them 
asylum, individuals are entitled to file communications with the 
                                                          
 143. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 17 (creating a Committee Against Torture and 
establishing selection procedures).  See generally OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, FACT SHEET NO. 17 (providing 
committee materials, including sessions, notes, complaints, and press releases), at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs17.htm (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 144. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 20 (outlining investigatory procedures 
comprised of confidential inquiries, reports, and visits). 
 145. See id. at art. 21 (delineating the requirements for State Party complaints 
regarding another State Party’s failure to abide by CAT provisions). 
 146. See id. at art. 22 (explaining the individual complaint process); see also 
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: 
OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURE, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/overcat.htm 
(last visited May 20, 2004).  See generally Documents by Treaty; CAT-Committee 
Against Torture; Jurisprudence, at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ 
newhvdocsbytreaty?OpenView&Start=1&Count=750&Expand=2.5#2.5 (last visited 
May 20, 2004). 
 147. See Copelon, supra note 122, at 356. 
 148. Implementation of CAT in each country depends upon the manner in which 
each legal system incorporates international treaties and conventions within its legal 
system.  See, e.g., RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §111, cmt. h 
(2002)  (indicating that in the United States, it is up to the state “to decide how it will 
carry out its international obligations.  Accordingly, the intention of the United States 
determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United States or 
should await implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or administrative 
action”).  For example, the United States has signed and ratified CAT by enacting 
domestic legislation entitled the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 
1998, and a victim of torture seeking asylum in the United States may invoke this 
particular act.  See Stark 1, supra note 22, at 270; see also Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-761 (1998) (codified in 
22 U.S.C. § 6501). 
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Committee Against Torture.149  The committee, in turn, takes the 
individual communications into consideration, deliberates upon their 
admissibility and forms a view as to whether the provisions of CAT 
asserted in the communications were violated.150  The most often 
asserted CAT provision is Article 3, which forbids a state to return or 
extradite persons in danger of being tortured back to their country of 
origin.151  Following its deliberations, the committee then advises the 
violating state in question to redress its practice (that is, not return or 
extradite individuals in danger of being tortured and grant him/her 
asylum in accordance with its obligations under CAT).152  Thus, 
technically, if a domestic violence victim is suffering abuse that could 
be equated to torture and is denied asylum, she may invoke Article 3 
of CAT and file a communication against the state that is denying her 
asylum before the Committee Against Torture. 
E.  Customary International Law 
Some scholars maintain that domestic violence standards have 
become part of customary international law, which is binding in 
nature: 
Customary international law may be shown through state practice 
over time, in the form of state adherence to international treaties, 
declarations, or General Assembly resolutions; through the 
enactment of domestic legislation, through executive action, and 
through a state’s own judicial decisions.  The accretion of such 
practice, accompanied by evidence that the state believed that such 
practice was legally mandated, constitutes [customary international 
law].  Where consensus among states is great, and no state objects, 
less practice may be needed.153 
States can be held responsible for tolerating and/or failing to 
prevent domestic violence through the application of customary 
international law.  Professor Barbara Stark makes the case that by 
signing the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
                                                          
 149. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 22; see also OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 146.  See generally 
Documents by Treaty, CAT-Committee Against Torture; Jurisprudence, supra note 
146. 
 150. See CAT, supra note 7, at art. 22. 
 151. See id. at art. 3. 
 152. See, e.g., Communication 149/1999: Sweden, CAT/C/25/D/149/1999, 
paras. 8.2, 9 (2001) (advising Sweden that, under Article 3 of CAT, it was prohibited 
from forcibly returning an Iranian citizen back to her country of origin because there 
were “substantial grounds for believing that . . . she would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture”), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ 
3c43aa8300384387c1256ab1002fea71?Opendocument (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 153. See Stark 1, supra note 22, at 266. 
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Women, 180 states have symbolically confirmed the importance of 
combating domestic violence and can be held liable for failing to do 
so through the declaration 
in conjunction with the proliferation of domestic legislation, 
executive action, and national judicial decisions which followed, 
along with the repeated references to state responsibility for 
domestic violence in reports of the Human Rights Commission, the 
Special Rapporteur on Domestic Violence, and other international 
instruments as well as regional human rights instruments . . . .154 
Professor Stark further explains that once the responsibility of states 
vis-à-vis domestic violence is established in customary international 
law, the substance of domestic violence standards could be 
“understood as a clarification and elaboration of existing [general 
international] human rights norms.”155 
III.  REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
In order to better understand the development of domestic 
violence standards at the international level, one must also consult 
various regional human rights instruments.  The European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”),156 the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“ACHR”)157 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“African Charter”)158 provide broad bases from which battered 
women can assert their individual rights against their state of 
citizenship.  Once again,  it should be emphasized that not all of the 
provisions that are about to be analyzed are applicable in all domestic 
violence situations, since a state can choose to sign/ratify the 
aforementioned documents with reservations to certain provisions.159
                                                          
 154. See id. at 267. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See generally ECHR, supra note 8. 
 157. See generally ACHR, supra note 9. 
 158. See generally African Charter, supra note 11. 
 159. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 44, at art. 19 
(delineating requirements for making reservations); see also ECHR, supra note 8, at 
art. 57, para. 1. 
Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its 
instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular 
provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its 
territory is not in conformity with the provision.  Reservations of a general 
character shall not be permitted under this article. 
Id. 
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Furthermore, these particular instruments have precise regional 
limitations.160 
A.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) 
Domestic violence norms can be read into the ECHR161 in the same 
manner as they were read into the International Bill of Human Rights 
and other international human rights instruments.  That is, the ECHR 
acknowledges the right to life in Article 2162 and the right to be free 
from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in Article 3.163  Since Article 1 requires all States Parties 
to secure the rights and freedoms delineated within the ECHR “to 
everyone within their jurisdiction”164 and since Article 14 discusses 
the ECHR’s ban on gender-based discrimination, women and men 
are equally entitled to the aforementioned rights.165  Thus, battered 
women can seek help through the domestic legal system and if (after 
exhausting all domestic remedies) their situation does not improve, 
they can hold their state of citizenship liable for failing to provide 
them with an effective remedy.166  It is worth noting that the scope of 
Article 13, which delineates the right to an effective remedy, is not 
limited to violations of human rights by public officials; this article 
applies “notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity.”167 
Consequently, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) 
has found in favor of domestic violence victims, whose rights were 
violated by private persons (i.e. their partners), and against their state 
of citizenship because the state failed, inter alia, to provide them with 
proper access to the courtroom and with effective legal remedies.  In 
Airey v. Ireland, a woman sought a court-ordered separation from her 
                                                          
 160. See ECHR, supra note 8, at pmbl.; see ACHR, supra note 9, at pmbl.; see 
African Charter, supra note 11, at pmbl. 
 161. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 59, para. 2 (“The present Convention shall 
come into force after the deposit of ten instruments of ratification.”).  The ECHR 
entered into force on September 3, 1953. 
 162. See id. at art. 2. 
 163. See id. at art. 3. 
 164. See id. at art. 1 (emphasis added). 
 165. See id.  at art. 14.  It should be noted that Article 14 of the ECHR cannot be 
invoked on its own.  The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) indicates that 
“Article 14 . . . has no independent existence; it constitutes one particular element 
(non-discrimination) of each of the rights safeguarded by the Convention . . . .” See 
Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, 318 (1979). 
 166. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 13. 
 167. See id. 
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violent husband, but the Irish government did not provide her with 
legal aid in order to pursue her claim.168  Starting in June 1972, Mrs. 
Johanna Airey of Cork, Ireland sought a decree of judicial separation 
alleging that her husband physically and mentally abused her and her 
children.169  Her husband had been previously convicted for 
assaulting her and fined.170  Given her low income, Mrs. Airey could 
not retain a solicitor to represent her in the separation proceedings 
and, at that time, the state of Ireland did not offer legal aid for civil 
matters.171  As a result, Mrs. Airey filed a petition with the then 
existing European Commission of Human Rights (“European 
Commission”),172 which forwarded it to the ECtHR.173  Her 
complaint stated the following: 
[T]he State [of Ireland] had failed to protect her against physical 
and mental cruelty from her allegedly violent and alcoholic 
husband: 
-by not detaining him for treatment as an alcoholic; 
-by not ensuring that he paid maintenance to her regularly; 
-in that, because of the prohibitive cost of proceedings, she could 
not obtain a judicial separation.174 
In order to sustain her last allegation, Mrs. Airey invoked the 
following ECHR provisions: 
-Article 6 [para. 1] of the Convention, by reason of the fact that her 
right of access to a court was effectively denied; 
- Article 8 . . . by reason of the failure of the State to ensure that 
there is an accessible legal procedure to determine rights and 
obligations which have been created by legislation regulating family 
matters; 
-Article 13 . . . in that she was deprived of an effective remedy 
before a national authority for the violations complained of; 
                                                          
 168. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 310 (explaining that in Ireland, legal aid was not 
provided for a person seeking a judicial separation of a marriage). 
 169. See id. at 311 (claiming that the State failed to protect Mrs. Airey and her 
children from the alcoholic and violent Mr. Airey). 
 170. See id. (explaining how the District Court of Cork City convicted and fined 
Mr. Airey for assault in January 1972). 
 171. See id. at 307-10. 
 172. See THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE (2003) [hereinafter ECTHR BACKGROUND] (explaining 
how the European Commission of Human Rights (“European Commission”) and the 
original European Court of Human Rights were replaced by a full-time court on Nov. 
1, 1998), at  http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/ HistoricalBackground.htm (last 
visited May 18, 2004). 
 173. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R at 310-11. 
 174. Id. 
33
Vesa: International and Regional Standards for Protecting Victims of Do
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004
VESA.DOC 9/10/2004  4:59 PM 
342 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 12:2 
-Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6. [para. 1] in that judicial 
separation is more easily available to those who can afford to pay 
than to those without financial resources.175 
The ECtHR found that because Mrs. Airey’s financial situation 
prevented her from hiring an attorney and she would not be able to 
effectively represent herself in her judicial separation proceedings 
and since legal aid was not made available in such civil suits, Ireland 
breached Article 6, paragraph 1 of the ECHR that guarantees the 
right to access the judicial system.176  Setting aside Mrs. Airey’s 
allegations under Article 14177 and Article 13178 for procedural 
reasons, the ECtHR also found that the state of Ireland was in 
violation of Article 8 of the ECHR, which the Court read as 
establishing the right to respect for private and family life.179  The 
ECtHR reasoned that: 
[A]lthough the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting 
the individual against arbitrary interference by the public 
authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from 
such interference: in addition to this primarily negative 
undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an 
effective respect for private and family life.180 
According to the Court, Ireland violated this particular right by not 
facilitating the judicial separation of the Aireys.  The ECtHR 
explained in the following manner: 
In Ireland, many aspects of private or family life are regulated by 
law.  As regards marriage, husband and wife are in principle under 
a duty to cohabit but are entitled, in certain cases, to petition for a 
decree of judicial separation; this amounts to recognition of the fact 
that the protection of their private or family life may sometimes 
necessitate their being relieved from the duty to live together.  
Effective respect for private or family life obliges Ireland to make
                                                          
 175. Id. 
 176. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 6, para. 1; see also Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 318 
(“Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court finds that Mrs. Airey 
did not enjoy an effective right of access to the High Court for the purpose of 
petitioning for a decree of judicial separation.”). 
 177. See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 318 (explaining that Article 14 of the ECHR 
(prohibiting discrimination) has “no independent existence”).  Article 14 is solely 
used to qualify other rights delineated in the ECHR, therefore, it was not analyzed 
separately for the purposes of the Airey case.  Id. 
 178. Id. at 319 (indicating that Article 13, which guarantees the right to an 
effective remedy, overlaps with Article 6, paragraph 1, thus it would not be analyzed). 
 179. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 8; see also Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 319. 
 180. Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 319. 
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this means of protection effectively accessible, when appropriate, to 
anyone who may wish to have recourse thereto.181 
In Mrs. Airey’s case, the ECtHR concluded that the state of Ireland 
did not effectively provide for such protection since the petitioner was 
not able to reach the proper judicial forum and “she was unable to 
seek recognition in law of her de facto separation from her 
husband.”182  Consequently, Ireland violated Article 8 of the 
ECHR.183  Such is the manner in which the ECtHR interpreted and 
applied various ECHR provisions in favor of a victim of domestic 
violence. 
The ECtHR continued its trend of protecting battered women with 
the case of S.W. v. United Kingdom.184  In that case, the petitioner 
was charged with rape under England’s Sexual Offences Act, as well as 
threatening to kill and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, under 
England’s Offences Against the Person Act.185  The victim of these 
alleged crimes was his wife.186  A jury found the petitioner guilty of all 
three offenses187 and he appealed in domestic court, arguing that a 
husband could not be found guilty of raping his wife because, 
according to traditional British law, a woman gives her implied 
consent to sexual intercourse at the time of marriage.188  The 
petitioner recognized that British law had evolved, carving out certain 
exceptions to this absolute notion of implied consent,189 however, he 
argued that these changes in the law were not confirmed until later 
and, thus, were incorrectly, retroactively applied to his case.190  After 
all of his domestic appeals were unsuccessful, the petitioner filed an 
application with the European Commission (later referred to the 
                                                          
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 321 (holding four votes to three that Article 8 had been breached). 
 184. See S.W. v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 363 (1995). 
 185. See id. at 365 (reciting the charges against a male British citizen accused of 
raping his wife). 
 186. See id. (retelling the story of the turbulent marriage of the accused and his 
wife). 
 187. See id. at 369 (stating the accused was found guilty and sentenced to over five 
years in prison). 
 188. See id. at 365-68 (relying on a British common law principle established in 
1736). 
 189. See id. at 366 (describing the 1976 British case of R v. Steele where the 
implied consent to sexual intercourse of a wife could be revoked 1) by a court order 
or equivalent 2) by agreement or 3) by “withdrawal of either party from cohabitation, 
accompanied by a clear indication that consent to sexual intercourse has been 
terminated”).  See generally R. v. Steele, 65 Crim. App. R. 22 (1976). 
 190. See S.W., 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 368-70. 
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ECtHR) under Article 7 of the ECHR,191 which dictates that “[n]o 
one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act 
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under 
national or international law at the time when it was committed.”192  
The petitioner maintained that “he was convicted in respect of 
conduct, namely the rape upon his wife, which at the relevant time 
did not . . . constitute a criminal offence.”193 
The ECtHR responded by primarily acknowledging the importance 
of Article 7 of the ECHR as safeguarding against arbitrary 
prosecution, conviction and punishment by prohibiting retroactive 
application of the law and by stressing that offences must be clearly 
defined in the law.194  The Court emphasized, however, that Article 7, 
cannot be read as outlawing clarification of rules of criminal liability 
through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the 
result is consistent with the essence of the offence and could 
reasonably be foreseen.195  Thus, in the case at hand, the gradual 
modification of the common law principle that a husband cannot be 
found guilty of raping his wife,196 which included the development of 
exceptions to this absolute rule,197 was not barred by Article 7 of the 
ECHR because such changes were consistent with the essence of the 
general offense of rape in British law.198  Furthermore, the petitioner 
himself did not dispute the fact that, had the victim not been his wife, 
the conduct for which he was convicted could have constituted 
rape.199  Accordingly, the ECtHR coupled the gradual transformation 
of British law regarding marital rape with the petitioner’s acclamation 
and agreed with the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom that “a 
rapist remains a rapist subject to the criminal law, irrespective of his 
relationship with his victim.”200  The ECtHR’s overall conclusion was 
that, at the time of the alleged conduct on the part of the petitioner, a 
husband could be found guilty of raping his wife under British 
                                                          
 191. See id. at 373. 
 192. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 7, para. 1. 
 193. See S.W., 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 373. 
 194. See id. at 374. 
 195. See id. at 375. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See id. at para. 43. 
 198. See id. (“[T]here was an evident evolution, which was consistent with the very 
essence of the offence, of the criminal law through judicial interpretation towards 
treating such conduct generally as within the scope of the offence of rape.”). 
 199. See id. 
 200. Id. 
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criminal law.201  Thus, one could argue that by barring the 
petitioner’s Article 7 claim in such a manner, the ECtHR reaffirmed a 
vital protection and legal remedy for domestic violence victims: the 
criminal prosecution of their husbands for physical and sexual 
violence that rises to the level of marital rape.202 
Another protection made available to domestic violence victims by 
the ECtHR, is the Court’s affirmation of the prohibition of torture 
and ill-treatment delineated in Article 3 of the ECHR.203  In A. v. 
United Kingdom, the ECtHR found that the United Kingdom 
violated Article 3 by not providing adequate protection to a nine-year 
old boy who was repeatedly beaten with a cane by his stepfather.204  In 
February 1993, school authorities notified the Social Services 
Department that the petitioner, nine years old at the time, was often 
beaten by his stepfather.205  A medical consultation revealed that “the 
bruising [on A.’s body] was consistent with the use of a garden cane 
applied with considerable force on more than one occasion.”206  
British authorities arrested A.’s stepfather and charged him with 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm.207  At trial, the stepfather 
raised the defense that “parents and other persons in loco parentis 
are protected by the law if they administer punishment which is 
moderate and reasonable in the circumstances.”208  The jury entered 
a verdict of “not guilty” against the stepfather.209  Subsequently, A. 
filed an application with the European Commission, which was later 
forwarded to the ECtHR, alleging that the United Kingdom 
had failed to protect him from ill-treatment by his step-father, in 
violation of Articles 3 and/or 8 of the Convention; that he had 
been denied a remedy for these complaints in violation of Article 
13; and that the domestic law on assault discriminated against
                                                          
 201. See id. at 377 (stating that “by September 1990 there was significant doubt as 
to the validity of the alleged marital immunity for rape”). 
 202. See supra Part I (incorporating physical and sexual violence into the overall 
definition of domestic violence). 
 203. See ECHR, supra note 8, at art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). 
 204. See A. v. the United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 611 (1999). 
 205. See id. at 613-14 (stating that petitioner’s brother notified the head teacher 
about the physical abuse). 
 206. See id. at 614. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. (finding that the prosecution had not proven the stepfather was guilty 
of assault occasioning actual bodily harm). 
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children, in violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 
and 8.210 
Setting aside the allegations made under Articles 8, 13, and 14 of 
the ECHR for procedural reasons,211 the ECtHR analyzed two issues: 
whether the ill-treatment of A. attained the minimum level of severity 
such that it qualified as conduct prohibited by Article 3212 and 
whether the United Kingdom was to be held responsible under 
Article 3.213  As to the first issue, the ECtHR used the test for 
minimum severity, which is dependent upon “all [the] circumstances 
of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its 
duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the 
sex, age and state of health of the victim,”214 and found that the 
repeated beatings applied with considerable force upon A.’s person 
amounted to ill-treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR.215  As to the 
second issue, the ECtHR noted that Article 1 together with Article 3 
of the ECHR impose a duty upon states to implement measures 
ensuring that their citizens are not subjected to ill-treatment or 
torture, including situations when such treatment is administered by 
private individuals.216  Furthermore, the ECtHR stressed that 
“[c]hildren and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are 
entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence of the 
criminal law, against such serious breaches of personal integrity.”217 
In sum, the Court found that the United Kingdom was responsible 
under Article 3 since it did not adequately protect the applicant 
(through its laws) against ill-treatment by his stepfather.218 
It seems that victims of domestic violence would benefit 
significantly from the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 3 in this case.  
Battered women, who are subjected to abuse rising to the level of 
torture or ill-treatment under Article 3, could certainly qualify as 
vulnerable individuals who are especially deserving of state 
                                                          
 210. See id. at 615. 
 211. See id. at 626-27 (holding that if a finding was made under Article 3, the 
ECtHR would not deliberate upon Article 8, Article 14 or Article 13). 
 212. See id. at 616-17 (debating whether a stepfather hitting his stepson 
constituted “torture or inhumane, degrading treatment”). 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. at 618. 
 215. See id. at 619-20 (citing the significant physical injury, pain and humiliation 
as reasons to qualify the treatment under Article 3). 
 216. See id. at 621. 
 217. Id. at 622 (emphasis added). 
 218. See id. at 623. 
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protection.219  If their state of citizenship fails to protect them from a 
repeated pattern of severe abuse, either because of inadequate laws or 
laws that are inappropriately applied, then that state has violated 
Article 3 of the ECHR.220 
The ECHR is currently enforced by a newly mandated court, 
ECtHR, whose jurisdiction was reaffirmed in 1998 through Protocol 
No. 11 to the Convention.221  Previously, the two bodies that 
monitored ECHR implementation were a commission and a court.222  
The commission issued recommendations while the court (past and 
present) issues binding decisions.  Neither the past nor the present 
court, however, have police powers to compel States Parties to the 
ECHR to comply with their judgments.223  Thus a domestic violence 
victim can file her grievances with the ECtHR after she has exhausted 
all of her domestic remedies and her state of citizenship has failed to 
rectify her situation.  An ECtHR decision in favor of such a victim, 
though, could face enforceability challenges at the state level. 
B.  American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) and Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence Against Women (“Inter-American Convention 
on Violence Against Women”) 
The ACHR224 and the Inter-American Convention on Violence 
Against Women225 may also be used to protect the rights of battered 
women. The ACHR recognizes the right to life in Article 4226 and the 
right to humane treatment in Article 5.227  Women, together with 
men, are equally entitled to these rights.  The ACHR imposes upon its 
State Parties the obligation to respect and ensure the rights and 
freedoms included in the convention, for “all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction . . . without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, 
                                                          
 219. See id. at 622 (observing that Article 3 applies to the “protection of vulnerable 
individuals”). 
 220. See id. at 623-24. 
 221. See ECTHR BACKGROUND, supra note 172, at para. 6 (describing the creation 
of the new European Court of Human Rights). 
 222. See id. 
 223. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 552. 
 224. The ACHR entered into force on July 18, 1978.  See ACHR, supra note 9, at 
art. 74, para. 2 (“As soon as eleven states have deposited their instruments of 
ratification or adherence, the Convention shall enter into force.”). 
 225. See generally Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra 
note 10. 
 226. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 4. 
 227. See id. at art. 5. 
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sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”228  
Furthermore, the ACHR guarantees that “[a]ll persons are equal 
before the law.  Consequently, they are entitled, without 
discrimination, to equal protection of the law.”229  Given this clear 
ban on gender discrimination, the ACHR could prove to be helpful 
for battered women.  Thus, victims who find themselves subjected to 
domestic violence may make use of the legal remedies available to 
them through their domestic court system.  If these domestic 
remedies fail,230 broadly delineated human rights within the ACHR 
provide protection and hold their state of citizenship responsible at 
the regional level.231 
The Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, also 
known as the Convention of Belém do Pará, entered into force on 
March 5, 1995 and is geared entirely towards women’s rights, 
particularly women who have been subjected to some form of 
violence.232  Article 1 defines violence against women as “any act of 
conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or 
private sphere.”233  Thus, Article 1 covers victims who suffer physical 
or mental abuse within the home (i.e. domestic violence).  Article 3 
                                                          
 228. Id. at art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 229. Id. at art. 24. 
 230. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 46(1)(a) (requiring that before an individual 
petition is reviewed “remedies under domestic law [must] have been pursued and 
exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”); 
see also Fairén Garbi & Solís Corrales, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 6, at 17, para.  79 
(1989) (addressing the primary issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies), available 
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_13d.htm (last visited May 18, 2004); 
see also Velásquez Rodríguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, at 12, para. 61 (1988) 
(explaining that the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement “allows the State 
to resolve the problem under its internal law before being confronted with an 
international proceeding” and that the State has a legal duty to provide such 
remedies), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/4-ing.html (last 
visited May 20, 2004); see also Godínez Cruz, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 5, at 12, 
para. 70 (1989) (addressing the same requirement of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_14d.htm (last 
visited May 18, 2004). 
 231. See Garbi & Corrales, supra note 230, at para. 136 (“The objective of 
international human rights law is not to punish those individuals who are guilty of 
violations, but rather to protect the victims and to provide for the reparation of 
damages resulting from acts of the States responsible.”); see also Velásquez 
Rodríguez, supra note 230, at 30-31 (explaining the various components of state 
responsibility under the ACHR); see also Godínez Cruz, supra note 230, at 23, paras. 
140-42 (addressing the notion of state responsibility). 
 232. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10, 
at art. 21 (“This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date 
of deposit of the second State that ratifies or accedes to the Convention. . . .”). 
 233. Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added). 
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reaffirms that “[e]very woman has the right to be free from violence 
in both the public and private spheres.”234  Article 6 affirms every 
woman’s right to be free from violence which includes: “a) [t]he right 
of women to be free from all forms of discrimination; and b) [t]he 
right of women to be valued and educated free of stereotyped 
patterns of behavior and social practices based on concepts of 
inferiority or subordination.”235  In Article 7, States Parties to the 
convention pledge to undertake “policies to prevent, punish and 
eradicate” violence against women including passing domestic 
legislation in this vein, adopting legal measures requiring perpetrators 
“to refrain from harassing, intimidating and employing any method 
that harms or endangers” the lives, integrity or property of women, 
taking appropriate measures to stop customary practices that promote 
violence against women, and ensuring the existence of fair and 
effective legal procedures and remedies for victims of such 
violence.236  Thus, the Inter-American Convention on Violence 
Against Women seems to be the most pertinent regional instrument 
that domestic violence victims can invoke against their state of 
citizenship. 
In fact, a domestic violence case was brought before the Inter-
American human rights system in April 2001 invoking provisions of 
the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women in 
addition to applicable ACHR provisions.  Maria da Penha Maia 
Fernandes filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (“IACHR”)237 alleging that Brazil had failed to 
effectively prevent and punish brutal acts of domestic violence 
perpetrated against her by her husband over a period of more than 
fifteen years.238  On May 29, 1983, Mrs. Fernandes was shot by her 
husband while she was asleep.  This event was the culmination of a 
pattern of abuse against her and her children throughout the 
marriage.239  As a result of the shooting, Mrs. Fernandes sustained 
numerous injuries and suffered irreversible paraplegia as well as other 
                                                          
 234. Id. at art. 3. 
 235. Id. at art. 6. 
 236. See id. at art. 7. 
 237. See generally Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), 
available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/commissn.htm (last visited May 
20, 2004). 
 238. See generally Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. C. 
H.R., doc. 54/01 (2001) (retelling the story of repeated physical abuse by her 
husband and her claim for relief), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/ 
2000eng/chapteriii/merits/brazil12.051.htm (last visited May 18, 2004). 
 239. See id. at para. 2. 
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physical and psychological trauma.240  The violence continued upon 
her return from the hospital as her husband attempted to kill her 
again, this time by electrocution.241  She argued that the attacks were 
premeditated since her husband had previously asked her to sign a 
life insurance policy and attempted to force her to sign a sales 
contract on her car, which did not indicate the name of the 
purchaser.242  Subsequently, Mrs. Fernandes also learned that her 
husband had a criminal record, practiced bigamy, and fathered a 
child in Colombia.243  Her husband was eventually prosecuted for the 
1983 shooting in domestic court.244  Despite the clearly stated charges 
and the preponderance of evidence, the proceedings were prolonged 
for eight years with a jury finally convicting and sentencing him to 
fifteen years in prison for assault and attempted murder on May 4, 
1991.245  An appeals court overturned the verdict accepting the 
defense’s argument that the questions to the jury were flawed.246  On 
March 15, 1996, a second trial by jury took place in domestic court 
sentencing Mrs. Fernandes’ husband to ten years and six months in 
prison.247  A second appeal followed and the decision was still 
pending when Mrs. Fernandes filed her petition with the IACHR on 
August 20, 1998.248  The state of Brazil did not respond to the 
IACHR’s requests in connection with her claim.249 
Given these facts, Mrs. Fernandes alleged in her petition that the 
local judicial system and the state of Brazil were “ineffective, as seen in 
their failure to conduct proceedings in a prompt and efficient 
manner, thereby creating a great risk of impunity, since punishment 
in this case will be barred by the statute of limitations twenty years 
after the occurrence of these events. . . .”250  The state of Brazil should 
have ensured that Mrs. Fernandes received compensation for her 
suffering “by guaranteeing her a fair trial within a reasonable time 
                                                          
 240. See id. at para. 8. 
 241. See id. at para. 9 (retelling the events of the second murder attempt). 
 242. See id. at para. 10. 
 243. See id. 
 244. See id. at paras. 12-13. 
 245. See id. at para. 13. 
 246. See id. at para. 15. 
 247. See id. at paras. 16-17. 
 248. See id. at para. 4. 
 249. See id. at para. 25 (“The Brazilian State has not provided the Commission 
with a response regarding the admissibility or the merits of the petition, despite the 
requests of the Commission to the State on October 19, 1998, August 4, 1999, and 
August 7, 2000.”). 
 250. See id. at para. 19. 
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period.”251  Furthermore, the delayed response to the abuse 
perpetrated against Mrs. Fernandes was not an isolated incident: “it is 
an example of a pattern of impunity in cases of domestic violence 
against women in Brazil, since the majority of complaints filed do not 
lead to criminal prosecution and in the few cases where they do, the 
perpetrators are convicted in only a small number of cases.”252  Citing 
statistics, Mrs. Fernandes argued that Brazil had failed to prevent 
domestic violence, in general, and had failed to investigate, prosecute 
and punish domestic abusers despite its international obligations.253  
Lastly, Mrs. Fernandes indicated that the delay on the part of 
Brazilian judicial authorities to render a decision against her husband 
not only raised statute of limitations issues but would also create 
difficulties if she attempted to seek civil reparations.254  Mrs. 
Fernandes asserted the above claims as violations of the following 
rights inscribed in the ACHR: Article 1, paragraph 1 (obligation to 
respect),255 Article 8 (right to fair trial),256 Article 24 (right to equal 
protection),257 and Article 25 (right to judicial protection).258  All 
ACHR rights were related to Articles II259 and XVIII260 of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (“American 
Declaration”).  Mrs. Fernandes also invoked Articles 3,261 4(a)-(g),262 
                                                          
 251. Id. 
 252. See id. at para. 20. 
 253. See id. at para. 21. 
 254. See id. at para. 23. 
 255. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 1, para. 1 (stating that the Convention must 
ensure that all persons are free to exercise the rights and freedoms recognized by the 
Convention without discrimination). 
 256. See id. at art. 8. 
 257. See id. at art. 24. 
 258. See id. at art. 25. 
 259. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX 
(1948), art. II [hereinafter American Declaration] (“All persons are equal before the 
law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor.”), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 260. See id. at art. XVIII (“Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect 
for his legal rights.  There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief 
procedure whereby courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his 
prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.”). 
 261. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10, 
at art. 3 (“Every woman has the right to be free from violence in both the public and 
private spheres.”). 
 262. See id. at art. 4(a)-(g) (ensuring certain rights for women such as the right to 
life, right to physical, mental and moral integrity, right to personal liberty and 
security, right to be free from torture, right to privacy within personal and family life, 
right to equal protection and right to legal recourse). 
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5263 and 7264 of the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against 
Women. 
The IACHR responded by analyzing Mrs. Fernandes’ case on the 
merits and by drawing certain preliminary conclusions before 
referring the case to the IACtHR.265  Concerning Brazil’s obligation 
to respect and ensure266 the right to justice inscribed in Article XVIII 
of the American Declaration,267 ACHR Article 8, guaranteeing the 
right to fair trial,268 and ACHR Article 25, ensuring judicial 
protection,269 the IACHR found a violation.270  The IACHR indicated 
that “the judicial delay and long wait for decisions on appeals reveal 
conduct on the part of the judicial authorities that violates the right to 
the prompt and effective remedies provided for in the Declaration 
and the Convention.”271  Furthermore the commission found that: 
the domestic judicial decisions in this case reveal inefficiency, 
negligence, and failure to act on the part of the Brazilian judicial 
authorities and unjustified delay in the prosecution of the accused.  
These decisions are standing in the way of punishment of the 
accused and are raising the specter of impunity and failure to 
compensate the victim as a result of barring of the offense by the 
statute of limitations.  They demonstrate that the State has not been 
capable of organizing its entities in a manner that guarantees those 
rights.272 
As to Article 24 of the ACHR, ensuring equal protection before the 
law,273 together with Articles II274 and XVIII275 of the American 
Declaration, the IACHR also found a violation.276  The commission 
                                                          
 263. See id. at art. 5 (describing the full entitlement of women to freely and fully 
exercise their rights, which are inscribed in regional and international instruments, 
and acknowledging that violence against women is an impediment in this regard). 
 264. See id. at art. 7 (outlining the duties of States to “prevent, punish and 
eradicate” violence against women). 
 265. See Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238, at para. 3 (concluding 
that the state violated Mrs. Fernandes’ rights to a fair trial and judicial protection, and 
that the violation forms a pattern in Brazil of condoning domestic violence against 
women). 
 266. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 1, para. 1. 
 267. See American Declaration, supra note 259, at art. XVIII. 
 268. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 8. 
 269. See id. at art. 25. 
 270. See Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238, at para. 141. 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. at para. 44. 
 273. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 24. 
 274. See American Declaration, supra note 259, at art. II. 
 275. See id. at art. XVIII. 
 276. See Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238, at para. 3. 
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made reference to various reports, including a domestic violence 
study conducted in Brazil as well as one of its special reports on the 
human rights situation in Brazil, and found that Brazilian authorities 
are not responding properly to the needs of battered women.277  
While improvements have been made, such as the establishment of 
special police stations to address reports of violence against women, 
the creation of shelters, and a Supreme Court decision to strike down 
the notion of the “honor defense” as a justification for wife-killing in 
Brazil, the IACHR declared that “these initiatives have not had any 
effect whatsoever.”278  Lastly, the IACHR found a violation of Article 7 
of the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, 
which outlines various duties that States owe their citizens in 
preventing, punishing and eradicating violence against women 
(domestic violence included)279 as well as a violation of Articles 3280 
and 4(a)-(g)281 of the same instrument.282  The IACHR reasoned that 
[t]he failure to prosecute and convict the perpetrator under these 
circumstances is an indication that the State condones the violence 
suffered by Maria da Penha, and this failure by the Brazilian courts 
to take action is exacerbating the direct consequences of the 
aggression by her ex-husband.  Furthermore . . . that tolerance by 
the State organs is not limited to this case; rather, it is a pattern . . . . 
Given the fact that the violence suffered by Maria da Penha is part 
of a general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by the 
State in prosecuting and convicting aggressors, it is the view of the 
Commission that this case involves not only failure to fulfill the 
obligation with respect to prosecut[ion] and convict[ion], but also 
the obligation to prevent these degrading practices.  That general 
and discriminatory judicial ineffectiveness also creates a climate that 
is conducive to domestic violence, since society sees no evidence of 
willingness by the State, as the representative of the society, to take 
effective action to sanction such acts.283 
                                                          
 277. See id. at para. 47 (finding that clear discrimination exists against battered 
women  arising from an inadequate justice system and uneven application of national 
and international laws  in Brazil). 
 278. Id. at para. 50. 
 279. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10, 
at art. 7 (condemning all forms of violence against women). 
 280. See id. at art. 3 (delineating that all women have the right to be free from 
violence). 
 281. See id. at art. 4(a)-(g) (outlining the right to life, right to physical, mental and 
moral integrity, right to personal liberty and security, right to be free from torture, 
right to privacy within personal and family life, right to equal protection and right to 
legal recourse). 
 282. See Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238, at para. 3. 
 283. See id. at paras. 55-56. 
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Consequently, the IACHR indicated that Brazil had violated the 
aforementioned provisions of the Inter-American Convention on 
Violence Against Women.284 
Mrs. Fernandes’ petition marked a milestone for women’s rights 
because it is one of the first cases to apply the Inter-American 
Convention on Violence Against Women and because it has brought 
attention to the issue of domestic violence in the Inter-American 
human rights system.  In 2002, the IACHR continued this trend by 
issuing a report that addressed the problem of violence against 
women (domestic violence included) occurring in Ciudad Juárez, 
Mexico.285  Responding to the requests of numerous 
nongovernmental organizations, the IACHR examined and reported 
on a disturbing pattern of killings in Ciudad Juárez: since 1993, over 
200 women had been killed and left in impunity as the state failed to 
investigate, prosecute, punish and prevent such crimes.286  The 
IACHR found that “many of these killings are manifestations of 
violence based on gender, particularly sexual violence and domestic 
or intra-familial violence.”287  Furthermore, the Commission pointed 
out that 
While public and official attention [in Mexico] have focused on the 
brutality of and fear associated with the so-called “serial” killings, 
insufficient attention has been devoted to the need to address the 
discrimination that underlines crimes of sexual and domestic 
violence, and that underlies the lack of effective clarification and 
prosecution.288 
Reiterating Mexico’s obligations under various international and 
regional human rights instruments, including the ACHR and the 
Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women,289 the 
IACHR concluded its report with several recommendations geared to 
improve the application of due diligence “to investigate, prosecute 
and punish violence against women . . . and overcome impunity” as 
well as “to prevent violence against women . . . and increase their 
security” in Ciudad Juárez.290  Since the issuance of this report, the 
                                                          
 284. See id. at para. 58. 
 285. See generally INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE SITUATION 
OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CIUDAD JUAREZ, MEXICO: THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 
VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION (2002) [hereinafter CIUDAD JUAREZ REPORT], available 
at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/chap.vi.juarez.htm (last visited May 20, 
2004). 
 286. See id. at paras. 3, 7, 41-68. 
 287. See id. at paras. 11, 57-64. 
 288. See id. at paras. 11, 69-87. 
 289. See id. at paras. 99-108. 
 290. See id. at paras. 161-end (concluding with general recommendations to 
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IACHR has received, and is currently processing, several individual 
petitions concerning the death of women and girls in Ciudad 
Juárez.291 
Both the ACHR and the Inter-American Convention on Violence 
Against Women are interpreted and enforced by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”)292 and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”)293 with respect to members of 
the Organization of American States294 who are States Parties to the 
two instruments.  The IACHR can receive and analyze 
communications alleging violations of the ACHR from States Parties 
to the convention against other States Parties.295  More specifically, 
the IACHR can receive petitions from individuals (and NGO’s) 
containing allegations that a particular State Party violated the 
ACHR296 and/or the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against 
Women.297  The IACHR then issues nonbinding recommendations 
and/or refers the petitions to the IACtHR.298 
With respect solely to the Inter-American Convention on Violence 
                                                          
improve the domestic violence situation in Cuidad Juárez). 
 291. See CIUDAD JUAREZ REPORT, supra note 285, at para. 26 (processing four 
petitions, 104/02, 281/02, 282/02, and 283/02, at this time and evaluating other 
petitions as they are filed). 
 292. See generally Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), at 
http://www.oas.org/ (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 293. See generally Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”), at 
http://www.oas.org/ (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 294. See ACHR, supra note 9, at pmbl. 
 295. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524; see also ACHR, supra note 9, at arts. 45-46 
(describing communications that can be initiated by States Parties to the ACHR 
against other States Parties and delineating the filing requirements for state 
petitions). 
 296. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524; see also ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 44 
(allowing individuals or groups that are legally recognized members of the 
organization of American States to file petitions with the IACHR against States 
Parties). Also delineating the filing requirements for individual petitions.  Id. at art. 
46. 
 297. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10, 
at art. 12 (indicating that individuals and groups can lodge petitions with the IACHR 
alleging violations of the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women).  
The IACHR has, in fact, been poised to interpret the Inter-American Convention on 
Violence Against Women in at least two cases: the case of Maria da Penha Maia 
Fernandes mentioned above and the case of Indravani Pamela Ramjattan.  See 
generally Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, supra note 238; see also Indravani Pamela 
Ramjattan, Case 11.837, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., no. 92/98, at 2 (1998), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/98eng/admissibility/t&t%2011837.htm (last visited 
May 20, 2004). The Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women does 
not, however, make express reference to the competence of the IACtHR.  See E-mail 
from Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(“IACHR”), to Andreea Vesa, Fellow, ABA/CEELI (Apr. 09, 2003, 12:37 EST) (on file 
with author). 
 298. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524-25. 
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Against Women, the Inter-American Commission on Women299 can 
also play an advisory role as petitions are forwarded.300  The IACtHR 
can issue binding decisions with respect to individual petitions 
referred by the IACHR (or by States Parties directly).301  The IACtHR 
may also issue advisory opinions regarding the interpretation of the 
ACHR and the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against 
Women at the request of the IACHR or States Parties.302  The 
IACtHR’s decisions are final and not subject to appeal.303  Thus, 
domestic violence victims can utilize both regional mechanisms (the 
commission and the court) in order to assert their rights and hold 
signatories of the ACHR and the Inter-American Convention on 
Violence Against Women legally responsible for failing to protect 
them from their abusive partners.  Just like in the European system of 
human rights, though, enforceability of IACtHR decisions could 
become a problem at the state level. 
C.  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African 
Charter”) and Its Draft Protocol 
Another regional instrument that may be used by victims of 
domestic violence is the African Charter, which entered into force on 
October 21, 1986.304  The Charter imposes a general duty upon its 
States Parties to “recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined 
in [the] Charter and . . . to adopt legislative or other measures to give 
effect to them.”305  The right to life and integrity of the person are 
                                                          
 299. See Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10, 
at art. 10. 
 300.   One expert explains that the IACHR primarily interprets the Inter-American 
Convention on Violence Against Women and its juridical application.  However, the 
Inter-American Commission on Women also has a role in receiving reports as to the 
implementation of the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women and, 
in turn, reports on that information.The main difference between the IACHR and 
the Inter-American Commission of Women is that the former is composed of 
independent autonomous experts, while the latter is composed of state appointed 
delegates representing each of the States Parties to the Inter-American Convention 
on Violence Against Women.  See E-mail from Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, supra note 
297. 
 301. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524-25; see also ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 61, 
para. 1 (“Only the States Parties and the Commission shall have the right to submit a 
case to the Court.”). 
 302. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 524; see also ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 64; see 
also Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women, supra note 10, at art. 
11. 
 303. See ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 67. 
 304. See African Charter, supra note 11; see also List of Countries Who Have 
Signed, Ratified/Adhered to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ratz1afchr.htm (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 305. African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 1. 
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inscribed in Article 4 of the Charter.306  Article 5 guarantees the right 
to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.307  Article 16, paragraph 1 of the African Charter 
emphasizes that “[e]very individual shall have the right to enjoy the 
best attainable state of physical and mental health.”308  Gender 
equality is a constant theme throughout the African Charter.  Article 2 
affirms that “[e]very individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of 
the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present 
Charter,”309 while Article 3 declares that “[e]very individual shall be 
equal before the law”310 and “[e]very individual shall be entitled to 
equal protection of the law.”311  Article 18, paragraph 3 discusses 
women’s rights in particular and indicates that “[t]he State shall 
ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and 
also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as 
stipulated in international declarations and conventions.”312  One 
commentator makes the point that while the Charter touches upon 
gender equality, the aforementioned articles still fail to fully address 
women’s issues because they do not dedicate separate provisions 
solely to women.313  However, by placing certain limitations on 
                                                          
 306. See id. at art. 4. 
 307. See id. at art. 5 (prohibiting all forms of exploitation and degradation of man, 
“particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment 
and treatment”). 
 308. Id. at art. 16, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 309. Id. at art. 2 (emphasis added). 
 310. Id. at art. 3, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 311. See African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 3, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
 312. Id. at art. 18, para. 3. 
 313. Julia Harrington makes the following observations: 
Article 2 might be criticized, however, on grounds that it fails to give 
sufficient weight to women’s rights because sexual discrimination is placed in 
the middle of a long list of other grounds on which distinctions are not 
permitted.  Given the extremely serious discrimination that women suffer in 
Africa, it might be thought that a separate article specifically on women 
would have been more appropriate to give the rights of women the weight 
that they need and deserve.  Articles 3-14 of the Charter present civil and 
political rights; none mentions women specifically . . . . 
On the other hand, the plain language of Article 18.3 requires states to 
eliminate every form of discrimination against women, and the article’s 
reference to ‘international declarations and conventions’ has wide 
significance in that it incorporates international standards, including those in 
nonbinding declarations.  The African Charter’s provisions, including those 
on economic rights, have more detailed counterparts in the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  By reference 
to Article 18.3, the provisions of the Women’s Convention are essentially 
incorporated into the African Charter.  This is of particular significance 
because relatively few African states have ratified the Women’s Convention, 
and many have done so with substantial reservations. 
Julia Harrington, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in 2 
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others, the Charter inadvertently provides additional protections from 
which women can benefit.314  For example, Article 28 imposes a duty 
on every individual  “to respect and consider his fellow beings without 
discrimination.”315  One could argue that by imposing such a duty 
upon men, women are automatically protected.316  Thus, victims of 
domestic violence are entitled to invoke the above provisions of the 
African Charter in order to require their state of citizenship to uphold 
their right to life, right against torture and ill-treatment, right to good 
mental and physical health as well as their right to be protected from 
gender-based discrimination and to provide them with the requisite 
safeguards and legal remedies against their abusers. 
A more relevant document for domestic violence victims within the 
African system is the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (“Protocol to 
African Charter”).317  This document was initiated by a working group 
in January 1998.318  A Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in 
Africa was also appointed in order to oversee the continued 
development of the protocol.319  Among other things, the instrument 
requires States Parties to the African Charter to undertake 
appropriate measures in order to eliminate discrimination against 
women320 as well as violence against women (including domestic 
violence).321  However, as of March 2004, the protocol remains in
                                                          
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 455-70, 457, 459 (Kelly D. Askin & 
Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000). 
 314. See id. at 460. 
 315. African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 28. 
 316. See Harrington, supra note 313, at 460 (stating, “Given that men discriminate 
against women at least as much as women discriminate against men, this article can 
only be an advantage to women.”). 
 317. See generally Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 (1999)  [hereinafter 
Draft Protocol to African Charter], available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/ 
women_en.html (last visited May 20, 2004). 
 318. See Eleventh Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 22nd-23rd Sess., at para. 33 (1997-1998), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/11thannualrpt.html (last visited May 20, 
2004). 
 319. See id. at para. 33 (appointing Mme. Julienne Ondzeil-Gnelenga as the 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women). 
 320. See Draft Protocol to African Charter, supra note 317, at art. 2. 
 321. See id. at art. 4(2)(a)  (calling for the prohibition of “all forms of violence 
against women including unwanted or forced sex whether the violence takes place in 
private or public . . . .”). 
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draft form,322 thus, it cannot currently be enforced along with the 
African Charter. 
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (“African 
Commission”) was established in order to protect the rights 
delineated in the African Charter (as well as in other pertinent 
documents).323  According to Article 45, the commission has three 
central functions: to promote and protect human rights and to 
interpret the provisions of the African Charter.324  This body is also 
tasked with overseeing inter-state complaints325 and “other 
communications,” which include individual petitions.326  One author 
observes: 
The Commission’s mandate, articulated in Article 45 of the 
Charter, is very broad, but in practice its activities have been 
concentrated in three main areas: hosting conferences and 
seminars to inform various constituencies of their rights and 
obligations under the Charter; receiving periodic reports from 
states parties; and examining communications (individual cases) 
brought against governments for alleged violations of the rights in 
the Charter.  The Commission’s work on women’s rights takes place 
within these areas of activity.327 
While the African Commission “may resort to any appropriate 
method of investigation,”328 its decisions take the form of 
recommendations and it has been reluctant to challenge States Parties 
for not complying with the African Charter.329  In June 1998, a 
protocol to the African Charter was drafted in order to create an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights that would issue 
binding decisions.330  The protocol recently received the requisite 
                                                          
 322. See Gina Bekker, Africa, 22 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 137, 138 (2004) 
(explaining that the proposed Protocol to the African Charter does not yet have the 
requisite number of ratifications to come into force). 
 323. See African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 30. 
 324. See id. at art. 45. 
 325. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 601; see also African Charter, supra note 11, at 
arts. 47-54. 
 326. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 601; see also African Charter, supra note 11, at 
arts. 55-58. 
 327. See Harrington, supra note 313, at 456. 
 328. African Charter, supra note 11, at art. 46. 
 329. See HENKIN, supra note 39, at 601. 
 330. See id. at 600; see also Association for the Prevention of Torture, The African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights; Presentation, Analysis and Commentary: The 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Establishing the 
Court, at 3, Jan. 2000, available at http://www.apt.ch/africa/African%20Court.pdf 
(last visited May 20, 2004). 
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number of ratifications and came into force on January 25, 2004.331  
Since the court is still in the developing stages, it has not received any 
individual petitions yet; however it promises to be a much more 
adequate forum for victims of domestic violence than the African 
Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
This article is an attempt to assess the availability of mechanisms, 
both at the international and regional level, through which domestic 
violence victims can assert their rights against their state of citizenship 
after exhausting all viable domestic remedies.  The International Bill 
of Human Rights, comprised of the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR, 
other international human rights conventions such as CEDAW and 
CAT, and regional human rights treaties such as the ECHR, ACHR 
and the African Charter, offer general (as well as some specific) 
protections for battered women.  While I identified several provisions 
within each instrument that could possibly apply in situations 
involving domestic violence, these are not exhaustive lists.  
International and regional human rights instruments are flexible and 
can be invoked in various ways depending upon the situation of each 
victim.  Furthermore, the application of human rights instruments 
varies depending upon possible reservations entered by each State 
Party.  When invoking such instruments, though, one should remain 
aware of an overarching issue that straddles all human rights systems: 
enforceability is still a lingering weakness. 
 
                                                          
 331. Press Release, African Union, The Protocol on the African Court on Human 
Rights and Peoples’ Rights to Come Into Force Soon (Dec. 30, 2003), at 
http://www.pict-pcti.org/pdf/APHRC%20coming%20into%20force.pdf (last visited 
May 20, 2004). 
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